On 19/07/2016 9:47 pm, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
The who argument here, is one of fission, plus, identity. But what of
fusion. Let us say Biff, using magical teleportation technology,
clones himself into 2 identical guys called Biff and Biff zips off to
Moscow, Boff decides to shop for fishing equipment, in Helsinki. After
a few hours seeing the sights, buying some goods, Biff, bought a case
of Stoly, Boff, some fishing gear, both zap back to "Copenhagen,"
their site of origin. Once they arrive, they discuss their trips with
each other and agree to re-merge. The transporter is used, and Boff is
absorbed back into Biff. Biff emerges from the transporter, memories
of both places intact, and anticipating a weekend of fishing and
Stoly. This would be fission, then fusion or re-fusion.
Parfit has considered such a case:
Personal Identity
Suppose that the bridge between my hemispheres is brought under my
voluntary control. This would enable me to disconnect my hemispheres as
easily as if I were blinking. By doing this I would divide my mind. And
we can suppose that when my mind is divided I can, in each half, bring
about reunion.
This ability would have obvious uses. To give an example: I am near the
end of a maths exam, and see two ways of tackling the last problem. I
decide to divide my mind, to work, with each half, at one of two
calculations, and then to reunite my mind and write a fair copy of the
best result.
What shall I experience?
............
Personal Identity
My work is now over. I am about to reunite my mind. What should I, in
each stream, expect? Simply that I shall suddenly seem to remember just
having thought out two calculations, in thinking out each of which I was
not aware of thinking out the other. This, I submit, we can imagine. And
if my mind was divided, these memories are correct.
In describing this episode, I assumed that there were two series of
thoughts, and that they were both mine. If my two hands visibly wrote
out two calculations, and if I claimed to remember two corresponding
series of thoughts, this is surely what we should want to say.
If it is, then a person's mental history need not be like a canal, with
only one channel. It could be like a river, with islands, and with
separate streams.
Parfit appears to be undecided as to what to make of this, but it might
be of some interest to consider further.
--- (Derek Parfit, /The Philosophical Review/, Vol. 80 (1971) pp. 3-27)
Bruce
Personal Identity
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