On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with memories
gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition everything on
the person who will find that he won the lottery. But making that a hard
part of my identity doesn't make sense to me, otherwise you could not be
the same person and forget about it, or consider being the same person
who participated in the lottery who then went on to win it.
Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same person
as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine being a person
who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking up as a copy in
another branch who did not win it.
Saibal
On Thursday, 4 August 2016, smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:
Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million
chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and
think about planning your trip around the World next morning.
In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way. What will
happen is that the next morning you'll wake up as one of your copies
who did not win the lottery.
This is the flip side of the "anything that can happen will happen"
aspect of the MWI. While you have a copy who has won the lottery, in
fact there even exists an extremely freak copy who has won every
time, it's not true that if you find yourself as one of these
copies, you can expect to continue to be one of these copies.
If you think of something else and then return your thoughts about
your bank balance, then that is a new measurement, and in the MWI
the outcome is not fixed, there are only stable correlations. So, if
you already know that you have won the lottery, then you'll find a
consistent result upon a new measurement.
Saibal
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