On 01 Aug 2016, at 21:18, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/1/2016 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
the question is would there be more than one consciousness?
Well, that is an interesting question, but it is not relevant for
the understanding that computationalism leads to the problem of
extracting the physical laws from a measure on relative
computations problem in arithmetic.
What leads to that is the assumption that computations exist
independent of physics
Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary
metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and already a theorem of Peano
Arithmetic (still less that what is needed to enunciate Church Thesis).
It is a physicalist who *adds* the assumption that there is some
primary physical universe.
and that computations instantiate thoughts (independent of physics).
That computation instantiated thought is part of computationalism. But
we don't really assume that. We assume only that a first person can
manifest itself through a physical emulation of a digital relation.
But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the
different physical processes associated with location make the
thoughts different.
Yes, it is more pedagogical, but the "physical" used here is not
assumed to be primary, and the reasoning will just show that if we do
survive with a physical digital brain, then the physical is reduced to
an (fundamental and important) aspect of the "theology of number", or
if you prefer, of the mathematics of universal machine self-reference.
Are you OK with the QUESTION 1? Are you OK that in Helsinki,
P("drinking a coffee") = 1 in case both copies will receive a cup of
coffee?
It seems to me that some years ago, you did understand and ascertain
the seven first steps of the UD Argument, and only step 8 was still
unclear? You might elaborate if you get some doubt about step 3!
UDA is only an enunciation of a (mathematical) problem for the
computationalist, not a solution, even if it depicts the basic
(immaterialist) shape of the solution---in case computationalism would
be true, and that is what is exploited when we translate the problem
in the language of a Gödel-Löbian entity, and listen to its answer.
The first person is not the Gödel-Löbian entity, which is still a 3p
concept, but by incompleteness, we get a modal distinction between the
Gödel-Löbian entity and the Gödel-Lôbian entity conjuncted to a
reality (<>t) or truth (for each sentences p), and that associates
canonically a knower (first person) to an infinity of (abstract finite
body/relative representations). Physics is then given by the logic of
the Gödel-Löbian entity and a reality, emerging from all true sigma_1
sentences (the UDA in arithmetic). That gives a quantum logic, at the
bottom which was exactly what we need to step toward a measure à-la-
Gleason. Up to now, the three quantum logics that we get, actually,
fit with the empirical quantum logics.
Bruno
Brent
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