On 6/08/2016 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two
persons is inevitable.
It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the
diaries have differentiated.
Diaries are not people.
The first person are approximated/associated by their personal diaries.
I am not defined by any diary I might keep -- that is merely an
irrelevant adjunct.
Everett use a similar theory of mind, and indeed most account of the
QM-without-collapse use digital mechanism, more or less implicitly.
Accusations of bad faith are not required.
Sorry for the accusation of bad faith, but I hope now we can move on
step 4. I mean, come back to the original definition of first person
discourse.
The notion of first person and third person have been defined since
long, and you were persisting in talking like if it could be possible
that the first person experience does not bifurcate, differentiate.
When we comp we admit that the only way to know is asked the copies or
consulted their opinions and experiences, and then simple elementary
logic shows that they all differentiate.
I suggested doing the experiment and determining the answer empirically.
Logic can only tell us what follows from certain premises, and your
premises do not entail differentiation in the described circumstances.
We admit P=1 in the simple teleportation case, then the
differentiation is a simple consequence that the robot in W sees W,
believes he is in W, and as it is in W, he knows that he is in W (with
the antic notion of knowledge: true belief). The same for the robot in
M. They are both right, they have just differentiated. They both
confirmed "W v M", and refute "W & M", as, by computationalism, the
W-machine has been made independent from the M-machine.
Again, you merely assume differentiation, you do not prove its necessity.
The W-machine has no first person clue if the M-machine even exist,
and vice versa. (Or you bring telepathy, etc.).
I don't need telepathy to unify the various streams of my consciousness
-- to know that I am the person driving the car, talking to my wife,
etc, at a given moment. Neither is telepathy need if one person is in
two places at once.
You can't invalidate a reasoning by changing, in the reasoning, the
definition which have been given in the reasoning.The differentiation
are obvious. In the n-iterated case, the differentiations are given by
the 2^n sequences of W and M.
You continue to assume what you are required to prove.
Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against
computationalism. I assume it, and study the consequences.
There is little sense in studying the consequences of an inconsistent
theory: you have to defend computationalism against the charge that it
is not well-established.
Later, I can explain that the "P=1" of 'UDA step one' belongs to the
machine's G*\G type of true but non- justifiable proposition, which
can explain the uneasiness. "P=1" requires a strong axiom, and indeed
both CT and YD are strong axioms in "cognitive science/computer
science/theology".
So derive the necessity of differentiation from these axioms.
Bruce
Computationalism could be the most insane theology except for all the
others. I don't know if comp is true or not, but I am pretty sure that
IF digital mechanism is true, then the "correct theology" will be more
close to Plato than to Aristotle
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