On 07 Aug 2016, at 01:24, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/08/2016 9:00 am, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 07:51:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again.
No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single
consciousness through time. We get different input data all the
time but we do not differentiate according to that data.
I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two
identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of
indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is
input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead
the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In
normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see
complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear
many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our
consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience
has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and
sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is most
important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our
minds.
You appear to be conflating differentiation with disintegration. Yes
my consciousness now differs from what it was one second ago, but by
the YD I'm supposed to have survived from one second to the next.
Poetic use of language.
Hmm, not sure about that.
We're not supposed to ask what does "survive" mean. Actually it is a
very interesting question, but nobody, least of all Bruno, has
anything remotely resembling an answer.
With Parfit, it seems plausible that "survival" is what matters:
"persons" are secondary. This certainly needs more analysis.
But in the W/M experiment, both W and M can say they survived from
the
ancester H, but W did not survive from M, nor vice-versa. All three
are different from each other - they have differentiated.
'Survivor of' is not a transitive relationship, identity is.
Same conflation again. Personal identity is NOT the same as identity.
But survival is akin to continuation as in Nozick's theory. If the
end result of this is that two new "persons" are created as
"survivors/continuers" of the original, then maybe we can resolve
some of the difficulties.
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different
inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be
giving an account of.
Yes, but consciousness will be eas. But the point is that we have also
to give an account of matter, without assuming matter. I show that the
mind-body problem is a priori two times more difficult for a
computationalist, because he must explain not just consciousness and
mind, but also matter and its apparent persistance.
But in step 3, I ma very careful to not use the notion of
"consciousness", and instead a simple 3p notion of first person.
usually many relates it two consciousness and assumes that when the
guy say "I see Moscow", they are conscious, but that is not needed to
get the reversal.
Bruno
Bruce
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