On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > However, still no justification has been given for the assumption > that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different > inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be > giving an account of. >
Obviously different inputs does not entail the differentiation of consciousness. However computational supervenience does imply the opposite: differentiated consciousness entails a difference in inputs. In the W/M experiment we are asked to suppose that the duplicated persons do, in fact, notice that they've been teleported to a different city, and recognise where they they've been teleported to. Ie, W/M is a difference that makes a difference. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
