On 8/08/2016 8:38 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 07, 2016 at 09:24:31AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
However, still no justification has been given for the assumption
that the duplicated consciousness differentiates on different
inputs. And consciousness is what computationalism is supposed to be
giving an account of.
Obviously different inputs does not entail the differentiation of
consciousness.
In duplication there is still only one consciousness: and as you say,
different inputs do not entail the differentiation of a single
consciousness (associated with a single brain/body). So why would it be
different if the body were also duplicated?
However computational supervenience does imply the
opposite: differentiated consciousness entails a difference in
inputs.
There is no difficulty in understanding that differentiated
consciousness entails different persons, who may or may not experience
different inputs, but I doubt that differentiation of consciousness
necessarily entails different inputs - two people can experience the
same stimuli.
In the W/M experiment we are asked to suppose that the
duplicated persons do, in fact, notice that they've been teleported to
a different city, and recognise where they they've been teleported to.
There is no difficulty in accepting that there is consciousness of two
cities, but is that one consciousness, or two? You beg the question by
referring to plural 'persons'.
Bruce
Ie, W/M is a difference that makes a difference.
Cheers
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