On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant >>>>> in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the >>>>> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, >>>>> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good >>>>> enough >>>>> from my pov. AG >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not >>>> sure >>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement >>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT >>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM >>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. >>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but >>>> I >>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical >>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>> >>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>> >>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>> >>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It >>>> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks >>>> like >>>> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine). >>>> >>> >>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of SWE, >>> namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the measurement >>> value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation occurs.It's in >>> the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based >>> since repeated measurements of the same system result in the same outcomes. >>> I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's existence. But its >>> statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet >>> to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG >>> >>> >>> >>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>> >> >> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG* >> >> >>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>> alive), >>> >> >> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, >> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >> >> >> >> Then the SWE is wrong. >> >> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, but >> there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the consistency >> of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known antic >> theory of mind (mechanism) >> >> > *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and > presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting > your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * > > > > In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No > unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). > > Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and > when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, > and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product). > Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like > if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if > the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever > occurred. > > > Bruno >
Please ignore my first response, but I stand by my second response. I see no way to apply the SWE to this problem. It's not a function of Alive and Dead. Thus, the idea of Alive and Dead interfering with other makes no sense in this context. AG > > > >> >> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG* >> >> >> >> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse solves >> it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more operate >> at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for the collapse, >> but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that the collapse >> is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then >> that hallucination is somehow necessary. >> >> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of the >> physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the mathematician in >> arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >> >> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of the >> appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we can test >> it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, the >> only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be completely >> explained in any first person convincing way (the so called hard problem, >> which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved the "easy >> part" (AI)). >> >> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in philosophy, >> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a branch >> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >> search the key around, not more. >> >> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover and >> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) >> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >> than the materialist Aristotelians. >> >> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the Aristotelian >> metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just beginning to be able >> to formulate the problem (which of Plato or Aristotle is closer to >> reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is still a very >> recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation >> with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results. >> >> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences of >> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic (both >> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described >>> by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, >>> and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can >>> be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the >>> linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave >>> evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically >>> (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their >>> measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they will >>> always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the >>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>> means something precise). >>> >>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible with >>> Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is >>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>> >>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >>> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the >>> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>> >>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs >>> no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the >>> meta-background). >>> >>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>> >>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>> x + 0 = x >>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>> x * 0 = 0 >>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>> >>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>> >>> Kxy = x >>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>> >>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the >>> UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer >>> to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>> >>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we >>> get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and >>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>> >>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we >>> remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness (or >>> just first person experience). >>> >>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a >>> physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body >>> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying >>> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We >>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >>> hypothesis. >>> >>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, >>> and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance >>> of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + >>> machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works >>> (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the >>> mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by the >>> Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago). >>> >>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last >>> match. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>>>>>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of >>>>>>> them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played >>>>>>> a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>>>>>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> would be a crazy question. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>>>>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean >>>>>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>>>>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >>>>>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >>>>>> consequence. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>>>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>>>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>>>>> some >>>>>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without >>>>>>> assuming >>>>>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >>>>>> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe >>>>>> the >>>>>> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM >>>>>>> wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes >>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear >>>>>> DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>>>>> leads to non-linearity. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>>>>>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>> >>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay >>>>>> congress. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between >>>>>>> macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive >>>>>>> science. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but >>>>>> he >>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >>>>>> It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> With the collapse. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. >>>>>>> Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a >>>>>>> lot >>>>>>> of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the >>>>>>> most, >>>>>>> and I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>>>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>>>>>> MWI. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the >>>>>>> many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural >>>>>>> numbers. We >>>>>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I >>>>>>> tend to >>>>>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be >>>>>>> done in >>>>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical >>>>>> reality, not about dreams. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>>>>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging >>>>>> from >>>>>> all computational histories. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, >>>>>>> when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an >>>>>>> earlier >>>>>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>>>>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't >>>>>> need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >>>>>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion >>>>>> similar >>>>>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, >>>>>> not in the original superposition. AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, >>>>>> and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>>>>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in >>>>>>> many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal >>>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of >>>>>>> mind). >>>>>>> The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary >>>>>>> evolution. >>>>>>> But of course that might be false, and is still an open problem in the >>>>>>> computationalist theory. But there too, we already got some evidence >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> linearity and a core symmetrical physical structure. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno >>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bob have >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), >>>>>>>>>>>>> or (-,-') >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality >>>>>>>>>>>>> follows from >>>>>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that >>>>>>>>>>>>> mean >>>>>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* >>>>>>>>>>>> other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence >>>>>>>>>>>> here and >>>>>>>>>>>> there and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the >>>>>>>>>>>> frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the >>>>>>>>>>>> linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, >>>>>>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>>> computable, in the global third person picture. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of >>>>>>>>>>>> 3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic) >>>>>>>>>>>> the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely >>>>>>>>>>>> epistemic >>>>>>>>>>>> (first person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with >>>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, or >>>>>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted >>>>>>>>>>>>> that there >>>>>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those >>>>>>>>>>>>> are real >>>>>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's >>>>>>>>>>> remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL >>>>>>>>>>> transmission >>>>>>>>>>> of information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, >>>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> claim (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>>>>> deny >>>>>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of >>>>>>>>>> the wf, >>>>>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you >>>>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction >>>>>>>>>>> between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by >>>>>>>>>>> appealing to >>>>>>>>>>> the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark >>>>>>>>>>> and Bruce >>>>>>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows >>>>>>>>>>> that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to >>>>>>>>> the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling >>>>>>>>> theorem? AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is >>>>>>>> not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>>>>> collapse >>>>>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>>>>> working >>>>>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of >>>>>>>> Mechanist >>>>>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>>>>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in >>>>>>>> worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it >>>>>>>> is a >>>>>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made >>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other >>>>>>>> worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate >>>>>>>> attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. >>>>>>>> OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a >>>>>>>> cat >>>>>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + >>>>>>>> looking >>>>>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>>>>> interact, >>>>>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people >>>>>>>> believing >>>>>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>>>>> thing, >>>>>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>>>>> "many-computations" >>>>>>>> i >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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