On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, [email protected] >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary >>>>>> for >>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an >>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not >>>>>> good >>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not >>>>> sure >>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>> measurement >>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT >>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know QM >>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes meaningless. >>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, but >>>>> I >>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past physical >>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>> >>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>> >>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. It >>>>> looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it looks >>>>> like >>>>> a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal machine). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of >>>> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation >>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result in >>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas the >>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of its >>>> advocates. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>> >>> >>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. AG* >>> >>> >>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>> alive), >>>> >>> >>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it does, >>> when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>> >>> >>> >>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>> >>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, >>> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest known >>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>> >>> >> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting >> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >> >> >> >> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? No >> unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >> >> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), and >> when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat state, >> and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor product). >> Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like >> if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if >> the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction ever >> occurred. >> >> >> Bruno >> > > Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, > presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may be > entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of > alive and dead. AG >
I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or dead. And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG > >> >> >>> >>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. AG* >>> >>> >>> >>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse solves >>> it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more operate >>> at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for the collapse, >>> but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that the collapse >>> is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then >>> that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>> >>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of the >>> physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the mathematician in >>> arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>> >>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of >>> the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we can >>> test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, >>> the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be >>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called hard >>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved >>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>> >>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >>> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in philosophy, >>> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a branch >>> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >>> search the key around, not more. >>> >>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover and >>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) >>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>> >>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the Aristotelian >>> metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just beginning to be able >>> to formulate the problem (which of Plato or Aristotle is closer to >>> reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is still a very >>> recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation >>> with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results. >>> >>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences of >>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic (both >>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well described >>>> by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>> multiplicatively, >>>> and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can >>>> be considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the >>>> linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave >>>> evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically >>>> (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their >>>> measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that they >>>> will >>>> always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains the >>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>>> means something precise). >>>> >>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible >>>> with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence is >>>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >>>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>> >>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >>>> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that the >>>> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>> >>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs >>>> no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the >>>> meta-background). >>>> >>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>> >>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>> x + 0 = x >>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>> >>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>> >>>> Kxy = x >>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>> >>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of the >>>> UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I prefer >>>> to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>> >>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we >>>> get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and >>>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>> >>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we >>>> remain with the task of explaining what is their role for consciousness >>>> (or >>>> just first person experience). >>>> >>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a >>>> physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-body >>>> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying >>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. We >>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >>>> hypothesis. >>>> >>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem, >>>> and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the appearance >>>> of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* computations + >>>> machine self-reference when distributed in those computations. It works >>>> (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known that the >>>> mind-body problem has been put under the rug since Aristotle (except by >>>> the >>>> Platonists, who were just banned from our civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>> >>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last >>>> match. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my >>>>>>>> pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> them. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked >>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>>>>>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't >>>>>>> mean >>>>>>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>>>>>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering >>>>>>> histories. >>>>>>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation >>>>>>> consequence. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>>>>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>>>>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without >>>>>>>> assuming >>>>>>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, >>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ? >>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM >>>>>>>> wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes >>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>> here. >>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>>>>>> leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the >>>>>>> Solvay >>>>>>> congress. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between >>>>>>>> macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive >>>>>>>> science. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind >>>>>>> (but he >>>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us >>>>>>> probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> With the collapse. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. >>>>>>>> Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get >>>>>>>> a lot >>>>>>>> of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the >>>>>>>> most, >>>>>>>> and I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>>>>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> MWI. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the >>>>>>>> many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural >>>>>>>> numbers. We >>>>>>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I >>>>>>>> tend to >>>>>>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be >>>>>>>> done in >>>>>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical >>>>>>> reality, not about dreams. * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>>>>>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging >>>>>>> from >>>>>>> all computational histories. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, >>>>>>>> when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an >>>>>>>> earlier >>>>>>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>>>>>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't >>>>>>> need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion >>>>>>> similar >>>>>>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, >>>>>>> not in the original superposition. AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, >>>>>>> and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>>>>>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in >>>>>>>> many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal >>>>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of >>>>>>>> mind). >>>>>>>> The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary >>>>>>>> evolution. >>>>>>>> But of course that might be false, and is still an open problem in the >>>>>>>> computationalist theory. But there too, we already got some evidence >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> linearity and a core symmetrical physical structure. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno >>>>>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bob have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), >>>>>>>>>>>>>> or (-,-') >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality >>>>>>>>>>>>>> follows from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* >>>>>>>>>>>>> other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence >>>>>>>>>>>>> here and >>>>>>>>>>>>> there and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just >>>>>>>>>>>>> saying that >>>>>>>>>>>>> without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, >>>>>>>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>>>> computable, in the global third person picture. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of >>>>>>>>>>>>> 3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic) >>>>>>>>>>>>> the indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely >>>>>>>>>>>>> epistemic >>>>>>>>>>>>> (first person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> inequality violation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are real >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bell >>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's >>>>>>>>>>>> remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL >>>>>>>>>>>> transmission >>>>>>>>>>>> of information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, >>>>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>>> claim (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>>>>>> deny >>>>>>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of >>>>>>>>>>> the wf, >>>>>>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if >>>>>>>>>>> you can't >>>>>>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" >>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a >>>>>>>>>>> message of >>>>>>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction >>>>>>>>>>>> between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by >>>>>>>>>>>> appealing to >>>>>>>>>>>> the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the >>>>>>>>>>>> MWI restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of >>>>>>>>>>>> Clark and >>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation >>>>>>>>>>>> proves that >>>>>>>>>>>> nature is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows >>>>>>>>>>>> that FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to >>>>>>>>>> the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling >>>>>>>>>> theorem? AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is >>>>>>>>> not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>>>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>>>>>> collapse >>>>>>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like >>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>>>>>> working >>>>>>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>>>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of >>>>>>>>> Mechanist >>>>>>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of >>>>>>>>> the true believers could give a coherent account of these other >>>>>>>>> worlds; for >>>>>>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in >>>>>>>>> worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, >>>>>>>>> it is a >>>>>>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made >>>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>>>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other >>>>>>>>> worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate >>>>>>>>> attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. >>>>>>>>> OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion >>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a >>>>>>>>> cat >>>>>>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + >>>>>>>>> looking >>>>>>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>>>>>> interact, >>>>>>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people >>>>>>>>> believing >>>>>>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>>>>>> thing, >>>>>>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>>>>>> "many-computations" >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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