On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:00:03 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Sep 2016, at 12:38, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in > the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the > outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, > stated in another posts. They form part of your imagination. Not good > enough from my pov. AG > > > > I guess you misunderstood something, as eventually I show that with > computationalism, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic. Even > the induction axioms are already phenomenological. > > There is just no other worlds, nor even one world, only number dreams with > relative and varied degrees of consistency and coherence (seen as > multiple-consistency). > > The reasoning is deductive. I show mechanism and computationalism to be > logically incompatible up to possible (consistent) use of magic (which > remains always possible to save basically any theory). > > I explain how to extract physics, and I extracted the logic of the > observable (the sigma_1 sentences being simultaneously provable and > consistent, that is motivated by the informal Universal Dovetailer > Argument) and all this is shown meaningful thanks to Gödel's and Löb > incompleteness theorem). That leads the the logic of the "measure one" > propositions, and it happens that is related to a quantum logic similar, up > to now, to most quantum logics suggested by the empirical quantum mechanics. > > Now, those who see how Everett makes much more sense than Copenhagen, can > appreciate that what I did (and what all Löbian (inductive) universal > number does) is just the generalization from Everett (all quantum > computations) to *all* computations (which lives in a tiny part of > Arithmetic). > > Both the Universal Wave and the Collapse are phenomenological. Plato is > right if mechanism is true. It's all in the head of the universal > machine/number. My point is that this is testable, and thanks to > QM-Everett, partially tested already. >
*What's been tested? I never encountered an advocate of the MWI make that claim. OTOH, I have shown that collapse can be interpreted as tested by virtue of the fact that repeated measurements of the same system yield identical outcomes; implying that after the first measurement, the system remains in the eigenstate of the eigenvalue measured. AG * > > You seem to still believe in the second God of Aristotle (Primary > Matter/Universe). I am agnostic, but I do not see evidence for it, and even > think there are many evidences against it. > > I am not the one coming up with more ontology. I am the one skeptical > about the ontology taken granted by many. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of them. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a >>> slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that >>> would be a crazy question. >>> >>> >>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual or >>> conditional non standard logic to use. >>> >> >> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, like >> those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean they >> *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no necessity >> for that. AG * >> >> >> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >> consequence. >> >> >> >> >> >> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted with >>> the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>> >>> >>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because with >>> quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have some >>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming >>> the collapse of the wave. >>> >> >> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe the >> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >> >> >> ? >> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is purely >> linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >> >> >> >>> Accepting non linearity >>> >>> >>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave is >>> slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions >>> becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special >>> relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>> >> >> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear DE, >> and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >> >> >> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >> leads to non-linearity. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>> >> >> SWR = ? >> >> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >> >> >> >> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements which >> are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay congress. >> >> >> >> >> >>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between macro >>> and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive science. >>> >> >> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >> observed? You demand the impossible. * >> >> >> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It explains >> well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but he missed >> this happens directly with Mechanism). >> >> >> >> >> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >> It's not a causal theory. AG* >> >> >> With the collapse. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists >>> applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire >>> universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of >>> problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, and >>> I share a bit that opinion. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>> MWI. >>> >>> >>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many >>> histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We >>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend to >>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the >>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done in >>> elementary arithmetic. >>> >> >> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, >> not about dreams. * >> >> >> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from >> all computational histories. >> >> >> >> >> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >> >>> >>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when >>> inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier >>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>> >>> >>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>> >> >> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. That's >> the evidence for collapse; * >> >> >> >> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't need >> the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar >> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >> >> >> >> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not in >> the original superposition. AG* >> >> >> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, and >> which contradicts the SWE. >> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in many >>> exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal uniqueness is >>> an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). The evidences >>> are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary evolution. But of course >>> that might be false, and is still an open problem in the computationalist >>> theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for linearity and a >>> core symmetrical physical structure. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or >>>>>>>>> (-,-') >>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds anything >>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance which >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows >>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean >>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* other >>>>>>>> posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence here and >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>> and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the frame >>>>>>>> of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying that >>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>> any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the linearity >>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>> SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, even computable, in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> global third person picture. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of 3p >>>>>>>> sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>> arithmetic) the >>>>>>>> indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely epistemic >>>>>>>> (first >>>>>>>> person or first person plural). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that >>>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are >>>>>>>>> real >>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get over >>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark >>>>>>> above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission of >>>>>>> information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, your >>>>>>> claim >>>>>>> (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to deny >>>>>> FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to deny FTL >>>>>> in >>>>>> this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of the wf, and >>>>>> in >>>>>> his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you can't send >>>>>> information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in the >>>>>> context >>>>>> of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message of choice. >>>>>> AG * >>>>>> >>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between >>>>>>> relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to the >>>>>>> non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's violation >>>>>>> does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark and >>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>> nature >>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I posted >>>>>>> is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows that >>>>>>> FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the >>>>> MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling theorem? >>>>> AG * >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>> >>>> >>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is not >>>> an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>> collapse >>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all >>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>> working >>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is >>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of Mechanist >>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for >>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>> >>>> >>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in worlds, >>>> at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it is a >>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by >>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, and >>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>> >>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>> >>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>> >>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds, >>>> and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate attempt to >>>> avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. OK. >>>> But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of the >>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a cat >>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + looking >>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not interact, >>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people believing >>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>> thing, >>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>> "many-computations" >>>> in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* of >>>> "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. >>>> >>>> About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post is >>>> a bit out of the context of the thread. >>>> >>>> You asked in another post what is the FPI. >>>> It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the >>>> subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) self-duplication. >>>> Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made precise >>>> and >>>> explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that >>>> Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is >>>> conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that >>>> this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively >>>> with QM. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily >>>>>>> exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the >>>>>>> obligation >>>>>>> to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is >>>>>>> no >>>>>>> more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite >>>>>>> realties, >>>>>>> which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more generally. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG * >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I will >>>> let them to defend their point again, or not. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The question was specifically about some possible remnant of >>>>>>>> physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the non >>>>>>>> signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical action at a >>>>>>>> distance >>>>>>>> obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by Bell's inequality >>>>>>>> violation, >>>>>>>> but Bell's argument does not show action at a distance( in any unique >>>>>>>> branch if that exist), in the MWI. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never go >>>>>>>> quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set of >>>>>>>> space-time events closed for interaction. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interesting (but out of topic indeed). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes >>>>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>> >>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their >>>>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>>>> >>> prejudices. >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just as >>>>>>>>> >> others do -- how does that make your position any better than >>>>>>>>> that of >>>>>>>>> >> others? >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > No. I subtract axioms. >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+ >>>>>>>>> > unintelligible theory of mind) >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>> theory of >>>>>>>>> > mind) >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>> > of mind) >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism >>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>> > this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies"). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You may >>>>>>>>> claim >>>>>>>>> just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your axioms >>>>>>>>> as any >>>>>>>>> other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the physics >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary >>>>>>>>> stability >>>>>>>>> of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually >>>>>>>>> banish them. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/SJdbZNPRALg/unsubscribe >>>>>> . >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> <div style="word-w >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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