On 06 Sep 2016, at 12:38, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes
necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be
realized. But you have an out, stated in another posts. They form
part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG
I guess you misunderstood something, as eventually I show that with
computationalism, we cannot assume more than elementary arithmetic.
Even the induction axioms are already phenomenological.
There is just no other worlds, nor even one world, only number dreams
with relative and varied degrees of consistency and coherence (seen as
multiple-consistency).
The reasoning is deductive. I show mechanism and computationalism to
be logically incompatible up to possible (consistent) use of magic
(which remains always possible to save basically any theory).
I explain how to extract physics, and I extracted the logic of the
observable (the sigma_1 sentences being simultaneously provable and
consistent, that is motivated by the informal Universal Dovetailer
Argument) and all this is shown meaningful thanks to Gödel's and Löb
incompleteness theorem). That leads the the logic of the "measure one"
propositions, and it happens that is related to a quantum logic
similar, up to now, to most quantum logics suggested by the empirical
quantum mechanics.
Now, those who see how Everett makes much more sense than Copenhagen,
can appreciate that what I did (and what all Löbian (inductive)
universal number does) is just the generalization from Everett (all
quantum computations) to *all* computations (which lives in a tiny
part of Arithmetic).
Both the Universal Wave and the Collapse are phenomenological. Plato
is right if mechanism is true. It's all in the head of the universal
machine/number. My point is that this is testable, and thanks to QM-
Everett, partially tested already.
You seem to still believe in the second God of Aristotle (Primary
Matter/Universe). I am agnostic, but I do not see evidence for it, and
even think there are many evidences against it.
I am not the one coming up with more ontology. I am the one skeptical
about the ontology taken granted by many.
Bruno
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my
pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can
make of them.
OK.
As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and
played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone
asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't
get, I'd think that would be a crazy question.
I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which
counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use.
Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist,
like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't
mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I
see no necessity for that. AG
You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I
agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering
histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/
differentiation consequence.
But that's the question some physicists ask when they are
confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen
Interpretation.
I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because
with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus
have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially
without assuming the collapse of the wave.
How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene,
Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of
collapse, believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG
?
I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is
purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space.
Accepting non linearity
There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM
wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge:
interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This
makes wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc.
The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a
linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue
here. AG
OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse
leads to non-linearity.
So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and
that, strictly speaking the SWR is false.
SWR = ?
Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG
By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements
which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the
Solvay congress.
You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between
macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive
science.
How can we test our models without the duality of observer and
observed? You demand the impossible.
Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It
explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind
(but he missed this happens directly with Mechanism).
What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us
probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG
With the collapse.
That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence.
Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if
not the entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical
collapse get a lot of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one
Einstein disliked the most, and I share a bit that opinion.
and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to
accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to
support the MWI.
Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the
many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural
numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive
ontological reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world.
Those belongs to the imagination of the relative universal numbers,
whose proof of existence can already be done in elementary
arithmetic.
Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical
reality, not about dreams.
Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the
physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging
from all computational histories.
You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG
BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf,
when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at
an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG
Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence.
If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement.
That's the evidence for collapse;
Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't
need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch
the observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a
notion similar to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway
in arithmetic.
that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement,
not in the original superposition. AG
Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined,
and which contradicts the SWE.
Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism,
which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter.
Bruno
I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in
many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal
uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of
mind). The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and
unitary evolution. But of course that might be false, and is still
an open problem in the computationalist theory. But there too, we
already got some evidence for linearity and a core symmetrical
physical structure.
Bruno
On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
wrote:
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and
Bob have
>>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'),
or (-,-')
>>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds
anything
>>>> significant to the discussion.
>>>
>>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance
which are
>>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>>
>> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.
>
> By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality
follows from
> linearity.
Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean
absolutely nothing.
This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion.
Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not
understand or disagree with.
"locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of
total nonsense.
OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many*
other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence
here and there and then adding to the prejudices.
To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the
frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just
saying that without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor
product with the linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time
everything is local, even computable, in the global third person
picture.
Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of
3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in
arithmetic) the indeterminacies and the non local appearances
are purely epistemic (first person or first person plural).
> There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality
violation
> is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with
collapse, or
> Bohmian particules.
> I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted
that there
> was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those
are real
> action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.
There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell
non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get
over
thinking that non-locality means FTL action.
Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-
signalling theorem puts this issue
to rest. AG
In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this,
I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's
remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL
transmission of information, and that since the no-signal
theorem denies that, your claim (or any claim of FTL
transmission) is falsified.
Guess what, you were completely wrong.
I was the one who denies the FTL.
My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to
deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems
to deny FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a
property of the wf, and in his appeal to the no-signalling
theorem; as if to say, if you can't send information, there can't
be FTL. But here "send information" in the context of no-
signalling theorem just means you can't send a message of choice.
AG
What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG
The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction
between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by
appealing to the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to
assert.
I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's
violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible.
My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI
restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark
and Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation
proves that nature is 3p non local, and that action at a distance
exists.
I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I
posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG
It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows
that FTL exists, even without possible signalling.
Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG
Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to
the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-
signalling theorem? AG
Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI,
MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is
not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI
= wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate
+ collapse postulate. Of course both have some problem of
interpretation (like all theories). I tend to not accept the
notion of "physical world", and working in arithmetic I use only
the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is that both the
collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal number's
First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of Mechanist
Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong.
but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of
the true believers could give a coherent account of these other
worlds; for example, where the energy comes from,
Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in
worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For
me, it is a convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an
extrapolation made by numbers sharing sheaves of computation
verifying some measure weight, and such measure weighting must be
explained through the logic of self-reference. You might take a
look at my papers, like this one:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or this one, if you can access it:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014
and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other
worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a
desperate attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of
QM. AG
Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism.
OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the
contagion of the superposition of the particle (say) to the
observer. If you look at a cat in the dead+alive state, you end
yourself looking at a dead cat + looking at a alive cat. The given
brain states are orthogonal and do not interact, but can still
interfere statistically. This list is for people believing that
"everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular
thing, and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the
"many-computations" in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I
predicted the *appearance* of "many-worlds" before knowing about
quantum physics measurement problem.
About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited
post is a bit out of the context of the thread.
You asked in another post what is the FPI.
It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the
subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) self-
duplication. Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where
this is made precise and explained. The FPI is the building brick
of the argument showing that Mechanism and Physicalism are
incompatible, and that physics is conceptually reduced to
arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that this leads to
testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively with QM.
I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily
exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I
agree that it is logically possible, but people believing in that
have the obligation to give evidence, and my point is that in the
MWI, Bell's violation is no more an evidence, as Bell supposes
definite outcomes in definite realties, which makes no sense in
the MWI, nor in computationalism more generally.
I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG
Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I
will let them to defend their point again, or not.
Bruno
Bruno
The question was specifically about some possible remnant of
physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the
non signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical
action at a distance obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by
Bell's inequality violation, but Bell's argument does not show
action at a distance( in any unique branch if that exist), in
the MWI.
What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never
go quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light.
And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set
of space-time events closed for interaction.
http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf
Interesting (but out of topic indeed).
Bruno
>>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the
paradoxes came
>>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their
philosophical
>>> prejudices.
>>
>> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just
as
>> others do -- how does that make your position any better
than that of
>> others?
>
> No. I subtract axioms.
>
> Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+
> unintelligible theory of mind)
>
> Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist
theory of
> mind)
>
> Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist
theory
> of mind)
>
> And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism
makes
> this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies").
All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You
may claim
just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your
axioms as any
other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the
physics of
this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary
stability
of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually
banish them.
Bruce
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