Truly classical worlds cannot arise from QM, it's simply not possible
for the description of Nature in terms of a Hilbert space to somehow
reduce (in an exact sense) to a classical phase space. So, this whole
idea of a classical World at some macroscopic scale is not going to
work, unless you assume that QM does not provide for an exact
description of Nature.
Saibal
On 23-01-2017 20:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/23/2017 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jan 2017, at 21:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
It can make sense in a non mechanist theory of mind, but ... where
is that theory? Where is the "Heisenberg cut". (I have not yet
complete the reading of that note, though).
The MWI is not born with Everett, but with the Einstein/Bohr debate,
and eventually with von Neuman collapse of the wave theory. The
collapse of the wave is just a very mysterious happening,
contradicting the SWE,
Born postulated the probability interpretation of the wave-function
in order to give it empirical content. It doesn't "contradict"
anything - it adds a way to get observables from the SWE.
and invented to suppress the many-worlds which are implied by the
SWE.
It's questionable whether they are implied. To be "a world" means to
be a classical world. As Bohr realized having a classical world in
which records were permanent and sharable was essential. Although
there are suggestive arguments no one has yet shown how classical
worlds are implied by QM.
Brent
The non-many-world theory is just the theory saying that quantum
mechanics is false, that it does not apply to "me". It is the
coquetry of the one who want to be one and only one. But it is
consistent (which is cheap) and possible in case the brain does not
act like a machine, but that is, in this context, a highly
speculative assumption making everything more complicated. It is
never a good idea to make a theory more complex to favor one's
religious belief, like the belief is a unique physical universe.
Bruno
Brent
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Use this MWI [1] to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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[1]
https://aeon.co/essays/is-the-many-worlds-hypothesis-just-a-fantasy?utm_source=Aeon+Newsletter&utm_campaign=3700115874-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_411a82e59d-3700115874-69456137
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