Hi Brent,
I comment the last posts in one post.
On 25 Apr 2017, at 07:09, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/23/2017 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Apr 2017, at 06:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/21/2017 1:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But computations does not need matter, no more than the number 2
needs two bottles of milk to make sense.
The number 2 needs two instances of SOMETHING to make sense.
Yes, for example two unities.
Your point would be granted if 2 needs two instances of primary
pieces of matter, but that would beg the question.
Primary or not it needs two instances of something. My point is
that if we lived in some crazy would where given anything x there
was nothing y that could be conceptually paired with x , then there
would be no number two.
There would be no incarnation/implementation of the number 2 in that
crazy world, and plausibly no creature at all. But if we can imagine
some creature there, then it might conceive worlds with incarnation of
2, and even develop the belief in the notion of 2, and in Peano axiom,
independently of their possible implementations in some world.
This tends to be hidden in the axiomatic definition by using the
word "successor", but there has to be something in common between x
and y that allows y to be the successor to x.
What is common is their ancestor 0.
=================
On 4/23/2017 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Telmo was a bit short. The full proof relies on the fact that the
computations are realized in arithmetic,
That's not a fact. It's Platonist metaphysics.
Absolutely not. It is a logical consequence of x+0=x, etc. You might
say that it needs arithmetical realism, but then you can say that
Euclid's proof that there is an infinity of prime numbers needs
arithmetical realism, and all possible use of numbers needs
arithmetical realism. You have to introspect yourself and see if you
believe in elementary arithmetic. The only metaphysical, or better
theological axiom is the belief in the doctor ability to provide you a
comfortable digital brain transplant.
and that a universal machine cannot use primary matter in a magical
(non Turing emulable, and non FPI-recoverable) to select
computations.
The universal machine is an abstract hypothetical.
Maybe from the point of view of an hardcore materialist. I find the
natural numbers far more concrete than a chair, for which I need much
more neurons and computations to figure out what it means. This is
partially automated, and we are programmed to take such object for
granted, but this works because x+0=x and alike.
It is rather hypocritical to say primary matter is invoking magic
while you are hypothesizing infinite machines. What does it mean "to
select computations".
I have never assumed infinite machine. On the contrary I explained in
detail that the universal Turing machine is a finite object.
Mechanism's ontology is finitist. Then it is part of the finite
machine to be confronted to infinities, analysis, physics, but all
that belong to their imagination. All there is is 0 and the
successors, and the addition and multiplication laws.
To select a computation? Without quoting a context, it can means
different things, in both QM and computationalism.
In Everett QM, and in computationalism, it is the first person which
select a computation, without any will. Exemple: take the WM
duplication, when you open the door and see Moscow (say), your
consciousness select the computations in which you have been re-
implemented in Moscow. Same when you look at the schroedinger cat in
Everett QM. In both those case, the selection is not a physical
reality, in the sense that the alternative computations still exist.
But in QM, or even with computationalism, some people want that the
"non-selected (in the first person way)" computation disappears. In QM
they will introduce a wave packet reduction, or hidden variables, ...
With computationalism, some people will do the same, with some primary
matter playing the role of the selector.
In both QM-without-wave-reduction, and computationalism, that
selection is *purely* epistemic. Some third party are unable to see
it. They will see the Helsinki guy in both Moscow and Washington, but
they will understand why the guy in Moscow, and the guy in Washington
feels like something has been selected.
========================
On 4/23/2017 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No contradiction has been demonstrated.
You have to explain how your Matter select the computations on
which you are conscious.
But:
"Consciousness is an 1p notion
Computation is a 3p notion.
So with computationalism, consciousness IS NOT a computation. "
So how is a 1p notion "on" a 3p notion?
Not sure what you mean by "on". When the guy in Moscow write in his/
her diary "I opened the door and saw Moscow", he/she describes his
current most probable computation/history, from his/her points of
view. He adds a new axiom "I am in Moscow now" ([]p), and it is true
that he is in Moscow (p). The first person lives at the intersection
of the 3p representational belief and truth.
Computationalism explains instead why there is an illusion of
matter and why it remains stable.
Does it? I'd like to hear that explanation.
All computations are realized in Arithmetic. Computationalism
associate a consciousness to all Löbian entity emulated by those
computations. But from the 3-1 view, we know that there is an infinity
of computations, made by an infinity of universal numbers, and the FPI
explains why below the substitution the machine is directly confronted
to that infinity. So physics is given by a sum on that infinity, and
the math shows that this sums is non trivial, and that the "measure
one" obeys a quantum logic. That explains pretty much were physics
come from, and in a way which makes the hypothesis testable, by
comparing that physics with the physics inferred from observations.
Everett QM confirms the multi-histories aspect, and Quantum logic
confirms (up to now) the quantum logic extracts from self-reference.
The details are developed elsewhere. I can only sump up a lot, here.
==========================
On 4/23/2017 5:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sure, but the question is not about the need to have a physical
brain to met people with physical brain, no one doubt that, but on
how to explain such physical brain without just saying "God made
it", or "Matter made it".
No the problem, for computationalism, is why we don't meet people
without a physical brain.
That seemed either like a white rabbit, in case you are talking about
physical people. But if you talk about all possible people, the
interview PA illustrates that we have meet someone without a physical
brain. Now, *we* are physical entity so we need our physical brain to
enjoy the conversation, and they need our physical brain to manifest
themselves relatively to us, but they have no physical brain, and in
arithmetic, they can differentiate on many different type of realties
a priori. As long as they are correct, they will still have a physical
reality obeying to the measure one, and so will probably incarnate
themselves very quickly in quantum like sort of physical reality, and
will ask the same question as yours.
======================
On 4/23/2017 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And the conclusion is not a logical contradiction indeed, but then
you are like the guy who would say that despite thermodynamics
explains how a car move we keep the right to believe in invisible
horses.
But you say the car both moves and exists because of infinite
natural numbers and arithmetic and because "belief" == "proof".
Those are invisible horses too.
I certainly hope you believe what you prove. And as I limit myself to
correct rational machine, we can say that they prove what they believe
in. It is Gödel's theorem which explains that proof cannot be
knowledge, but only belief, as the machine cannot know that she is
correct.
And I do not say that the car both moves and exists because of
arithmetic. I say only that because of arithmetic, we don't have to
commit oneself in the ontology of cars and movement. There is no car,
nor movement, just dreams of car and movement explained by the Turing
universal number relations, which are true like 17 is prime is true.
Now, there might be too much dreams, so we have to tested that
explanation, and up to now, the test does not refute that theory, and
that is nice, because there are no other theories except the fairy
tales, or some magic first or second god (Aristotle).
==========================
On 4/23/2017 5:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We can detect physical worlds, but we can't detect *primary*
physical worlds, nor can be detect if we dream or awake, nor if the
dreams is due to a brain in vat, or a brain emulated by Robinson
Arithmetic.
You can't detect Robinson Arithmetic either.
I can't detect Brent Meeker either. I can detect only its body. Same
with RA. I "detect it" in one of its local body the book of Tarski,
Robinson and Mostowski. That is a poor body without brain, so I need
my brain to interview RA, like I would need the book of Einstein's
brain to have a conversation with Einstein.
I hope this helped. I am not always sure if you criticize
computationalism or the reasoning leading to its immaterialist/non-
physicalist consequences.
Bruno
Brent
There are no evidence for primary matter. If the logic X1* would
differ significantly from the logic of the observable quanta or
sensible qualia, *that* would be an evidence for some primary
matter hypothesis. But today, we have not yet found such evidences.
Much more work needs to be done. Both computationalism and QM give
until now evidences that there is no "scientifically meaningful"
notion or primary matter.
Bruno
Brent
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