On 26 Apr 2017, at 01:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/25/2017 7:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Brent,
I comment the last posts in one post.
On 25 Apr 2017, at 07:09, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/23/2017 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Apr 2017, at 06:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/21/2017 1:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But computations does not need matter, no more than the number
2 needs two bottles of milk to make sense.
The number 2 needs two instances of SOMETHING to make sense.
Yes, for example two unities.
Your point would be granted if 2 needs two instances of primary
pieces of matter, but that would beg the question.
Primary or not it needs two instances of something. My point is
that if we lived in some crazy would where given anything x there
was nothing y that could be conceptually paired with x , then
there would be no number two.
There would be no incarnation/implementation of the number 2 in
that crazy world, and plausibly no creature at all. But if we can
imagine some creature there, then it might conceive worlds with
incarnation of 2, and even develop the belief in the notion of 2,
and in Peano axiom, independently of their possible implementations
in some world.
That is exactly what I deny. In such a world the creature (if one
could exist) would never form the concept of "successor" meaning
next in a list of similar things.
I don't see why.
This tends to be hidden in the axiomatic definition by using the
word "successor", but there has to be something in common between
x and y that allows y to be the successor to x.
What is common is their ancestor 0.
But you can't have the concept of ancestor unless you already have
the concept of successor.
Sure.
=================
On 4/23/2017 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Telmo was a bit short. The full proof relies on the fact that the
computations are realized in arithmetic,
That's not a fact. It's Platonist metaphysics.
Absolutely not. It is a logical consequence of x+0=x, etc. You
might say that it needs arithmetical realism, but then you can say
that Euclid's proof that there is an infinity of prime numbers
needs arithmetical realism, and all possible use of numbers needs
arithmetical realism. You have to introspect yourself and see if
you believe in elementary arithmetic.
I never believe IN anything. It's a mystic/religious attitude - not
a scientific one.
Above, you just said that you deny something. So you believe
something. Without belief, I don't see what you mean by "I deny
something".
In science, we just called belief, when related to some reality,
"assumption", or "theorem" which means consequence of assumption.
We all believe in a physical reality, and even in a psychological
reality, and then we search the simplest assumptions capable of
explaining and relating those realities.
The only metaphysical, or better theological axiom is the belief in
the doctor ability to provide you a comfortable digital brain
transplant.
and that a universal machine cannot use primary matter in a
magical (non Turing emulable, and non FPI-recoverable) to select
computations.
The universal machine is an abstract hypothetical.
Maybe from the point of view of an hardcore materialist. I find the
natural numbers far more concrete than a chair, for which I need
much more neurons and computations to figure out what
it means.
Exactly. It is real because it is more than you can comprehend.
But all universal Gödel-Löbian machine discovers by pure introspection
that there is more than what they can comprehend. So they discover the
real.
Maybe they see it better because they are less distracted than the
poor soul who lost themselves in the deep innumerable dreams.
This is partially automated, and we are programmed to take such
object for granted, but this works because x+0=x and alike.
It is rather hypocritical to say primary matter is invoking magic
while you are hypothesizing infinite machines. What does it mean
"to select computations".
I have never assumed infinite machine. On the contrary I explained
in detail that the universal Turing machine is a finite object.
Mechanism's ontology is finitist. Then it is part of the finite
machine to be confronted to infinities, analysis, physics, but all
that belong to their imagination. All there is is 0 and the
successors, and the addition and multiplication laws.
To select a computation? Without quoting a context, it can means
different things, in both QM and computationalism.
In Everett QM, and in computationalism, it is the first person
which select a computation, without any will. Exemple: take the WM
duplication, when you open the door and see Moscow (say), your
consciousness select the computations in which you have been re-
implemented in Moscow.
That assumes a consciousness, a kind of dualism I thought we were
trying to explain - not assume.
There is dualism only if you belief that the appearance are real, but
they are only more probable continuations.
UDA rise a measure, on first person experience, problem. We are just
trying to make that clear, and then see how to solve it.
Bruno
Same when you look at the schroedinger cat in Everett QM. In both
those case, the selection is not a physical reality, in the sense
that the alternative computations still exist.
But in QM, or even with computationalism, some people want that the
"non-selected (in the first person way)" computation disappears. In
QM they will introduce a wave packet reduction, or hidden
variables, ... With computationalism, some people will do the same,
with some primary matter playing the role of the selector.
In both QM-without-wave-reduction, and computationalism, that
selection is *purely* epistemic. Some third party are unable to see
it. They will see the Helsinki guy in both Moscow and Washington,
but they will understand why the guy in Moscow, and the guy in
Washington feels like something has been selected.
========================
On 4/23/2017 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No contradiction has been demonstrated.
You have to explain how your Matter select the computations on
which you are conscious.
But:
"Consciousness is an 1p notion
Computation is a 3p notion.
So with computationalism, consciousness IS NOT a computation. "
So how is a 1p notion "on" a 3p notion?
Not sure what you mean by "on". When the guy in Moscow write in his/
her diary "I opened the door and saw Moscow", he/she describes his
current most probable computation/history, from his/her points of
view. He adds a new axiom "I am in Moscow now" ([]p), and it is
true that he is in Moscow (p). The first person lives at the
intersection of the 3p representational belief and truth.
Computationalism explains instead why there is an illusion of
matter and why it remains stable.
Does it? I'd like to hear that explanation.
All computations are realized in Arithmetic. Computationalism
associate a consciousness to all Löbian entity emulated by those
computations. But from the 3-1 view, we know that there is an
infinity of computations, made by an infinity of universal numbers,
and the FPI explains why below the substitution the machine is
directly confronted to that infinity. So physics is given by a sum
on that infinity, and the math shows that this sums is non trivial,
and that the "measure one" obeys a quantum logic. That explains
pretty much were physics come from, and in a way which makes the
hypothesis testable, by comparing that physics with the physics
inferred from observations. Everett QM confirms the multi-histories
aspect, and Quantum logic confirms (up to now) the quantum logic
extracts from self-reference. The details are developed elsewhere.
I can only sump up a lot, here.
==========================
On 4/23/2017 5:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sure, but the question is not about the need to have a physical
brain to met people with physical brain, no one doubt that, but
on how to explain such physical brain without just saying "God
made it", or "Matter made it".
No the problem, for computationalism, is why we don't meet people
without a physical brain.
That seemed either like a white rabbit, in case you are talking
about physical people. But if you talk about all possible people,
the interview PA illustrates that we have meet someone without a
physical brain. Now, *we* are physical entity
But what does that mean? You are using "physical" as a primary
marker - one that has to be assumed in our explanation.
Brent
so we need our physical brain to enjoy the conversation, and they
need our physical brain to manifest themselves relatively to us,
but they have no physical brain, and in arithmetic, they can
differentiate on many different type of realties a priori. As long
as they are correct, they will still have a physical reality
obeying to the measure one, and so will probably incarnate
themselves very quickly in quantum like sort of physical reality,
and will ask the same question as yours.
======================
On 4/23/2017 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And the conclusion is not a logical contradiction indeed, but
then you are like the guy who would say that despite
thermodynamics explains how a car move we keep the right to
believe in invisible horses.
But you say the car both moves and exists because of infinite
natural numbers and arithmetic and because "belief" == "proof".
Those are invisible horses too.
I certainly hope you believe what you prove. And as I limit myself
to correct rational machine, we can say that they prove what they
believe in. It is Gödel's theorem which explains that proof cannot
be knowledge, but only belief, as the machine cannot know that she
is correct.
And I do not say that the car both moves and exists because of
arithmetic. I say only that because of arithmetic, we don't have to
commit oneself in the ontology of cars and movement. There is no
car, nor movement, just dreams of car and movement explained by the
Turing universal number relations, which are true like 17 is prime
is true. Now, there might be too much dreams, so we have to tested
that explanation, and up to now, the test does not refute that
theory, and that is nice, because there are no other theories
except the fairy tales, or some magic first or second god
(Aristotle).
==========================
On 4/23/2017 5:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We can detect physical worlds, but we can't detect *primary*
physical worlds, nor can be detect if we dream or awake, nor if
the dreams is due to a brain in vat, or a brain emulated by
Robinson Arithmetic.
You can't detect Robinson Arithmetic either.
I can't detect Brent Meeker either. I can detect only its body.
Same with RA. I "detect it" in one of its local body the book of
Tarski, Robinson and Mostowski. That is a poor body without brain,
so I need my brain to interview RA, like I would need the book of
Einstein's brain to have a conversation with Einstein.
I hope this helped. I am not always sure if you criticize
computationalism or the reasoning leading to its immaterialist/non-
physicalist consequences.
I probe for understanding and explication.
Brent
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