On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 7:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 26 Apr 2017, at 11:17, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 4/25/2017 2:22 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Bruce Kellett >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24/04/2017 6:07 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish >>>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is the >>>>>>>> hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry Bruno, >>>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are >>>>>>>> declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that >>>>>>> computational supervenience is compatible with physical >>>>>>> supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be so >>>>>>> much >>>>>>> the worse for computationalism. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that >>>>>> computations performed by the brain are no different from any other >>>>>> computations. >>>>>> >>>>>> We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are >>>>>> compatible or not, correct? >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is >>>>>> physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the facts". >>>>>> This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that >>>>>> leaves no space for debate or reasoning. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> First, it is not an argument from authority, it is an argument made on >>>>> the >>>>> basis of all the available evidence -- consciousness supervenes on the >>>>> physical brain. >>>> >>>> >>>> Empirical evidence requires observation. How do you observe >>>> consciousness? I bet other people are conscious because they look >>>> similar to me, and I know I am. Are cats conscious? Bacteria? The >>>> universe as a whole? The Earth's ecosystem? Stars? I don't know, and >>>> nobody knows. >>>> >>>> We have a large amount of evidence for the brain being a computer >>>> capable of supporting complex algorithms that support behaviors that >>>> we label as "intelligent". Simplistic models of the brain (artificial >>>> neural networks) are now capable of things like recognising faces, >>>> driving cars and even producing nightmarish works of art. There is >>>> also massive evidence for this intelligent machine being an outcome of >>>> Darwinian evolution. All of this is clear. >>>> >>>> Consciousness? You are just sweeping the hard problem under the rug. >>>> Explain to me: >>>> >>>> 1. Why we are not just Zombies, with the exact some capabilities but >>>> no consciousness; >>>> 2. How consciousness emerges from the known laws of physics. What are >>>> the first principles that explain that emergence? Give me other >>>> emergent behabiors and I can show you the first principles. Not so >>>> with consciousness. >>> >>> >>> >>> I think that is wrong. It is not wrong because we can "explain >>> consciousness", it's wrong because we don't explain physics either. The >>> theories of physics are good predictors. So we believe them in proportion >>> to >>> the evidence. But as Newton said, "Hypothesi non fingo." Explanations >>> depend on understanding; i.e. you explain A in terms of B and B in terms >>> of >>> C and so on until you get to R or S or X... which you understand. >> >> >> I agree with your view of what science is, and of what a scientific >> explanation means. >> >>> So when >>> we explain behavior, including reported thoughts, in terms of physics of >>> the >>> body and brain and environment we will have provided all the explanation >>> possible. >> >> >> Perhaps it is true that it is all the explanation possible -- I don't >> question that. In fact, this is where I tend to disagree with Bruno. I >> am convinced that he proves that computationalism and physicalism are >> incompatible, but I am not convinced that he explains what >> consciousness is.
Bruno, sorry for the delay! > I think that mechanism gives the most of what we can hope for an explanation > of what consciousness is. > > A number e can refer to itself and develop true belief about itself, > including some guess in its relative consistency. I can understand self-referentiality, and at the same time that there is "something" to it that is profound but not fully graspable -- as Hofstadter talks about with his "strange loops". > Then the theory explains > why any Gödel-Löbian machine can access to the truth that such belief can be > correctly (but that is not seen by the machine, only by god/truth) related > to the truth, but only in a non communicable way. So the machine knows > truth, that she is unable to justify, and can only seem mysterious. I am ok with this. > That does not explains the whole of consciousness, but that reduce its > mystery to the mystery of our belief in anything Turing universal, like the > numbers. > > But then again, the numbers explains, by themselves, why if you belief in > anything less than them, you cannot get them, and so justify their > mysterious character. We don't know, and it is the fate of any machine to > not know that. > > Don't mind to much. I am not sure if what you miss is a part of mathematical > logic, or something about consciousness. Again, I am convinced by your explanation of why the mystery exists. For me, the hard problem remains: you talk about mathematical constructs. Physicalists talk about emergence from complex interactions of matter. I remain baffled and ask you the same question that I ask physicalists: what is the first principle from where consciousness arises? I confess I have a hard time formulating the question correctly. I feel that what I am trying to ask is so fundamentally simple that it becomes hard to write the real question. > The core of the explanation is in > the G/G* separation, and its inheritance by the intelligible and sensible > matter. We might come back at this some day or another. I am of course very > interested in trying to see what you miss here. The explanation is like the > cow koan: the head of the cow go through the window, like the legs and the > truncs, but not the tail. That will play a role also in the fact that > computationalism is a theology: the soul of the machine cannot understand > rationally that she will be resurrect. That is the fun of it: the soul of > the machine says "no" to the doctor, until some leap of faith in some > situation. This is harder for me to follow, but I think I follow you on the "barriers to knowledge". I definitely don't understand the cow koan! > Maybe I will just ask you this. 1) Do you agree that consciousness is a form > of knowledge? I'm not sure. I think that I know that I am consciousness, but that consciousness itself is unlike anything else that I can talk about. I am inclined to think that consciousness = existence. Perhaps it's such a simple and fundamental thing that it becomes almost impossible to talk about it. > 2) that knowable obeys the S4 axioms? > > S4 = > > [](A->B) -> ([]A -> []B) K > []A->A T > []A -> [][]A 4 > > Then incompleteness explains why this works with "[]" payed by provability, I don't understand this sentence, what do you mean by "payed by provability"? > and gives a temporal non nameable subject, which cannot identify itself with > any third person notion. Looks like my poor soul to me :) I agree that what I call "consciousness" is something that cannot identify itself with third person notions. This is what leads me to suspect that it is not something that can be studied scientifically. Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> >> What I don't like about your position is this: just because science >> cannot address (or as not so far been able to address) a mystery, >> doesn't mean that this mystery becomes irrelevant or that we can >> pretend it doesn't exist -- or worse, that we should pretend that we >> have a viable theory when we don't. This is essentially what makes me >> agnostic instead of an atheist: I recognise that the big mystery is >> there. Labelling people that recognise that the mystery is there as >> lunatics does not serve intellectual rigor. >> >>>> >>>> Then we can talk about evidence. >>>> >>>>> Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to >>>>> reject >>>>> that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be experts in >>>>> absolutely >>>>> everything, we frequently have to rely on authorities -- people who are >>>>> recognized experts in the relevant field. I am confident that when I >>>>> drive >>>>> across this bridge it will not collapse under the weight of my car >>>>> because I >>>>> trust the expertise of the engineers who designed and constructed the >>>>> bridge. In other words, I rely on the relevant authorities for my >>>>> conclusion that this bridge is safe. An argument from authority is >>>>> unsound >>>>> only if the quoted authorities are themselves not reliable -- they are >>>>> not >>>>> experts in the relevant field, and/or their supposed qualifications are >>>>> bogus. There are many examples of this -- like relying on President >>>>> Trump's >>>>> assessment of anthropogenic global warming, etc, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree that arguments from authority are necessary to save time, but >>>> in the context of a debate about a mystery of nature for which no >>>> strong and widely-accepted scientific theories exist, it is >>>> nonsensical to invoke authority. >>>> >>>> Also, this is not a place where people come to have their car >>>> repaired, or their doctor appointment. This is a discussion forum >>>> about the unsolved deep mysteries of reality. >>> >>> >>> Which is exactly the point. Because their mechanic can repair their car >>> they suppose we have explained cars - but we have only found the >>> Lagrangian >>> that described them. When we can write the programs that produce >>> "conscious" behavior of whatever kind we choose, cheerful, autistic, >>> morose, >>> lustful, humorous,..., then most people will think we have explained >>> consciousness. Mystics will still claim there's a "hard problem". >> >> >> This feels like thought policing. Of course the mystery is still >> there, and it's huge! Why am I conscious? I can't think of a more >> compelling mystery. Why is it so hard to say: "I don't know"? >> >> Congrats on your daughter's wedding! >> >> Telmo. >> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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