On 26 Apr 2017, at 11:17, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 4/25/2017 2:22 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 24/04/2017 6:07 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish
<[email protected]>
wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is
the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry
Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.
That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be
so much
the worse for computationalism.
I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any
other
computations.
We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they
are
compatible or not, correct?
Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the
facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority
that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.
First, it is not an argument from authority, it is an argument
made on
the
basis of all the available evidence -- consciousness supervenes
on the
physical brain.
Empirical evidence requires observation. How do you observe
consciousness? I bet other people are conscious because they look
similar to me, and I know I am. Are cats conscious? Bacteria? The
universe as a whole? The Earth's ecosystem? Stars? I don't know, and
nobody knows.
We have a large amount of evidence for the brain being a computer
capable of supporting complex algorithms that support behaviors that
we label as "intelligent". Simplistic models of the brain
(artificial
neural networks) are now capable of things like recognising faces,
driving cars and even producing nightmarish works of art. There is
also massive evidence for this intelligent machine being an
outcome of
Darwinian evolution. All of this is clear.
Consciousness? You are just sweeping the hard problem under the rug.
Explain to me:
1. Why we are not just Zombies, with the exact some capabilities but
no consciousness;
2. How consciousness emerges from the known laws of physics. What
are
the first principles that explain that emergence? Give me other
emergent behabiors and I can show you the first principles. Not so
with consciousness.
I think that is wrong. It is not wrong because we can "explain
consciousness", it's wrong because we don't explain physics either.
The
theories of physics are good predictors. So we believe them in
proportion to
the evidence. But as Newton said, "Hypothesi non fingo."
Explanations
depend on understanding; i.e. you explain A in terms of B and B in
terms of
C and so on until you get to R or S or X... which you understand.
I agree with your view of what science is, and of what a scientific
explanation means.
So when
we explain behavior, including reported thoughts, in terms of
physics of the
body and brain and environment we will have provided all the
explanation
possible.
Perhaps it is true that it is all the explanation possible -- I don't
question that. In fact, this is where I tend to disagree with Bruno. I
am convinced that he proves that computationalism and physicalism are
incompatible, but I am not convinced that he explains what
consciousness is.
I think that mechanism gives the most of what we can hope for an
explanation of what consciousness is.
A number e can refer to itself and develop true belief about itself,
including some guess in its relative consistency. Then the theory
explains why any Gödel-Löbian machine can access to the truth that
such belief can be correctly (but that is not seen by the machine,
only by god/truth) related to the truth, but only in a non
communicable way. So the machine knows truth, that she is unable to
justify, and can only seem mysterious.
That does not explains the whole of consciousness, but that reduce its
mystery to the mystery of our belief in anything Turing universal,
like the numbers.
But then again, the numbers explains, by themselves, why if you belief
in anything less than them, you cannot get them, and so justify their
mysterious character. We don't know, and it is the fate of any machine
to not know that.
Don't mind to much. I am not sure if what you miss is a part of
mathematical logic, or something about consciousness. The core of the
explanation is in the G/G* separation, and its inheritance by the
intelligible and sensible matter. We might come back at this some day
or another. I am of course very interested in trying to see what you
miss here. The explanation is like the cow koan: the head of the cow
go through the window, like the legs and the truncs, but not the tail.
That will play a role also in the fact that computationalism is a
theology: the soul of the machine cannot understand rationally that
she will be resurrect. That is the fun of it: the soul of the machine
says "no" to the doctor, until some leap of faith in some situation.
Maybe I will just ask you this. 1) Do you agree that consciousness is
a form of knowledge? 2) that knowable obeys the S4 axioms?
S4 =
[](A->B) -> ([]A -> []B) K
[]A->A T
[]A -> [][]A 4
Then incompleteness explains why this works with "[]" payed by
provability, and gives a temporal non nameable subject, which cannot
identify itself with any third person notion. Looks like my poor soul
to me :)
Bruno
What I don't like about your position is this: just because science
cannot address (or as not so far been able to address) a mystery,
doesn't mean that this mystery becomes irrelevant or that we can
pretend it doesn't exist -- or worse, that we should pretend that we
have a viable theory when we don't. This is essentially what makes me
agnostic instead of an atheist: I recognise that the big mystery is
there. Labelling people that recognise that the mystery is there as
lunatics does not serve intellectual rigor.
Then we can talk about evidence.
Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to
reject
that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be experts in
absolutely
everything, we frequently have to rely on authorities -- people
who are
recognized experts in the relevant field. I am confident that
when I
drive
across this bridge it will not collapse under the weight of my car
because I
trust the expertise of the engineers who designed and constructed
the
bridge. In other words, I rely on the relevant authorities for my
conclusion that this bridge is safe. An argument from authority is
unsound
only if the quoted authorities are themselves not reliable --
they are
not
experts in the relevant field, and/or their supposed
qualifications are
bogus. There are many examples of this -- like relying on President
Trump's
assessment of anthropogenic global warming, etc, etc.
I agree that arguments from authority are necessary to save time,
but
in the context of a debate about a mystery of nature for which no
strong and widely-accepted scientific theories exist, it is
nonsensical to invoke authority.
Also, this is not a place where people come to have their car
repaired, or their doctor appointment. This is a discussion forum
about the unsolved deep mysteries of reality.
Which is exactly the point. Because their mechanic can repair
their car
they suppose we have explained cars - but we have only found the
Lagrangian
that described them. When we can write the programs that produce
"conscious" behavior of whatever kind we choose, cheerful,
autistic, morose,
lustful, humorous,..., then most people will think we have explained
consciousness. Mystics will still claim there's a "hard problem".
This feels like thought policing. Of course the mystery is still
there, and it's huge! Why am I conscious? I can't think of a more
compelling mystery. Why is it so hard to say: "I don't know"?
Congrats on your daughter's wedding!
Telmo.
Brent
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