On 01 May 2017, at 02:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/05/2017 1:57 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2017, at 03:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/04/2017 1:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Apr 2017, at 23:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
The absurdity, if I've understood this, is that idea of physical
substitution leads to a conclusion that nothing physical is
needed.
The absurdity is that the first person experience in physics has to
be a sum on all computations (to be short).
This might cause some problems for the SAN04 argument.
The point of the argument in SANE04 is to show that there is a
problem. The argument transforms a problem (the mind-body problem, or
a part of it) into another problem: to find measure on the first
person view(s). The solution of the problem is begun with the
interview of the GödeLöbian Universal Machine, and its divine
psychanalist G*, say, which can justify many silence of the machine,
and its inability to define a variety of notion, which have still a
relation with their experience.
The "Yes, doctor" assumption says that if my brain is replaced by a
functionally correct digital device (at the appropriate substitution
level), then I would not be aware of any experiential change. But if
my first person experience is the sum on all computations that pass
through my conscious state, then no digital computer could ever be a
"sum on an infinity of computations",
Why? If that was the case, computationalism would be reftuted. But
the
sum is not on the computation, but on the first person experiences,
Which is not what you said in the quote above. The quote is "first
person experience in physics has to be a sum on all computations".
Perhaps it is all just a typo -- what you meant was "that the first
person experience *of* physics has to be the sum on all computations.
Right.
But even putting aside what "the sum on all computations" might
possibly mean, this is still not what you say in SANE04: to quote
again, "Physics is, in principle reduced to a measure on the
collection of computational histories, as seen from some first
person point of view." A measure on some collection is not a sum
over anything.
I use "sum" and "measure" synonymously. An habit among mathematicians,
especially when they want to avoid jargon and repetition. Like I use
"probability", despite I have already prove that it is a credibility
measure, closer to Dempster-Shafer than to Kolmogorov. It is better
not to try to be precise in the attempt to undersztand the problem, so
as not to be biased when we look at the solution.
There seems to be a confusion here between what is consciousness and
what is the origin of physics.
the whole point is that physics will be explained in fine by first
person (plural) experiences. The "confusion" is part of the problem
transformation result.
which add a modal structure on the 3p reality of the computations (in
arithmetic, or in any "universal base" we fix to start with).
so my conscious state could not be reproduced in this way.
Mechanism entails a non-cloning theorem for whatever is below our
substitution level, but "bet" on a level such that finite
approximation/truncation of our physical body, which make that
physical body a sum on all histories, in fact a local map of our
histories the most accessible. The physical reality becomes somehow
the border of the (universal) mind.
You are again referring to a "sum on all histories".
Take the iterated duplication as an example. The sum on first person
histories is given by the usual limiting pascal triangle (Gauss
Integral).
I don't know what that could possibly mean unless you are talking
about some quantum superposition,
Not quantum superposition, but either classically physical
duplication, or arithmetical superposition.
and that would not work for you in this context. At least the idea
of finding some measure over "the collection of computational
histories" makes some sort of sense, even if I disagree that this
could ever give you physics.
Try to show this, and then thanks to the UDA you can deduce that
computationalism is refuted.
In fact, as has been said, the sum on all computations is not Turing
emulable.
Indeed. But the sum on all computations can still be able to emulate
universal Turing machine. A machine cannot emulate a god, but a god
can still emulate a Turing machine.
What has "a god" got to do with it? Do you mean that although
physics is not Turing emulable, physics can emulate a Turing machine?
yes.
We certainly know that we can build a physical Turing machine.
Although why physics might not be Turing emulable is a little more
difficult to understand.
Well, it is a theorem with computationalism, although the non-
computability might be only due to the arithmetical superposition.
There might be a difficulty with real numbers in a digital machine,
but it is by no means clear that the physical universe as we current
understand it could not be a simulation run on some super digital
computer -- this is a very real worry for some people. As you say,
we cannot know what machine we are running on.
Thus my conscious state is not Turing emulable,
Indeed. It is not even Turing or Peano, or ZF definable.
That is the heart of the contradiction. If my conscious state is not
Turing emulable, then I must say "No" to the doctor.
That does not follow. My brain might be only something making it
possible for my platonic-consciousness to manifest itself relatively
to the local environment. Indeed, something like that will be enforced
at some point.
In fact, this statement of yours directly contradicts the claim in
SANE04: "[It follows from the] comp assumption that a correct
substitution level exists, and that we are Turing emulable."
Yes, in that paragraph, "we" denote our body. It is the "3-I".
and the "Yes, doctor" scenario fails -- we would have to say "No" to
the doctor.
That does not follow. You are using an equivalence, but above what
you
say works in only one direction. We bet on a level, entails that
below
that level, things are blurred,
No it doesn't. There is no entailment here, you have just asserted
that without proof.
It is a consequence of the UDA. Which step is invalid?
You bet on the existence of a substitution level at which your
consciousness is unaffected by the digital substitution, but that is
just betting on the idea that your consciousness is Turing emulable
Not at all. It is a betting on the idea that there is a substitution
level such that my body can be emulated at that level without me
seeing any difference.
-- it says nothing about what happens below that level.
?
read the UD Argument. And tell me what is wrong.
But then you go on to deny that your consciousness is Turing
emulable -- the argument becomes incoherent.
You confuse []p and []p & p. G¨can prove that they are extensionnally
identical, and intensionally different. Same here. It might seems
weird, but is an intuitive consequence of computationalism, and a
mathematical consequence in theoretical computer science. Of course it
is a subtle point, because without Gödel's incompleteness, all those
nuances would be eliminated.
but obviously we have good empirical reason that they are not blurred
so much of making the physical reality unable to emulate a Turing
machine. of course that's the part which needs to be explained.
You have not done a very good job of this explanation so far......
Ad hominem. The explanation is the machine's interview. In my papers,
I can only sum up a century of mathematical logic, but in the long
version, I explained everything (but then it is 700 pages long).
You must study at least one good textbook in mathematical logic if you
want understand how the explanation works, and the open problem it
rises in mathematical logic and computer science.
That was the goal or the reasoning: to get that problem. Then we can
interview the machine themselves on that measure problem, and thanks
to the fact that Gödel-Löbian machine knows their universality, and
can prove their own incompleteness, the least we get is that it would
be prematured to claim computationalism is refuted: the shadow of a
phase randomizer lurks in domain of numbers-when-seen-by-numbers.
The second problem with the idea that the first person experience
has
to be the sum on all computations,
It is the observable "world" which is that sum.
OK, that much becomes clear -- you simply had a typo in the quote
with which I began.
Yes.
But this still does not define what such a "sum" could be.
That is explained in the math part. The non-math part exposes only the
problem. The math part will only show that the measure one is already
enough quantum like to reject the first as a refutation, and to hope
for a Gleason theorem, or a phase randomization à-la Feynman. My work
is very modest (but radical only because it brings back (machine)
theology at the academy, and it put some doubt on the Aristotelian
theology (the belief in physicalism).
Or even how you will find the magic "measure" in which the observed
physical world has high probability.
We need to find some relevant semantics for the logic of []p & <>t (&
p), with p sigma_1. Then extract the general measure from it. We need
first some good axiomatization of those logic. I have already proved
that they exist for the propositional logic, and are quantum logic (in
a precise technical sense), and some of them have been axiomatized
since (the logics Z, by Eric Vandenbussche). You are welcome to pursue
the subject, but you need to study logic.
Bruno
the first person is more like Brouwer-Post creative germ, the
intuitionist subject isloated through the S4Grz1 logic. That one keep
intact its 'ombilic chord with truth.
It is the observable which needs a reality by default, wich is
translated in arithmetic through <>t (~beweisbar('~beweisbar f')).
[]p
& <>t (& p).
We go from the 3p representational (in a larger sense than say,
Fodor)
to the 1p non-representational-at-all, by linking the believer with
truth.
We go from 1p mind to 1p plural matter (by adding "<>t), a way to
ensure our dice will not disappear when we throw them: the
probabilities avoids the cul-de-sac worlds (in term of the Kripke
semantic of the logic of self-reference). You need study the domain a
little bit.
is that this renders duplication of persons impossible. If you
duplicate the computation(s) that make up a first person experience,
you have simply added some more computations to that experience and
the sum over *all* computations is unchanged. Thus there is still
only one first person experience, and the attempted duplication
fails.
That does not follow, for the reason explained above.
It does follow if you continue to use the word "sum".
Or you just say materialism is true, so computationalism is false,
which was exactly the objet of the reasoning.
So, if the "Yes, doctor" assumption, and the subsequent duplication
scenarios, lead to the conclusion that the first person experience
is
a sum on all computations, the argument is self-contradictory: the
conclusion contradicts the input assumptions and the argument is
incoherent.
Well tried :)
Don't patronize me.
Bruce
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