>>> I think that mechanism gives the most of what we can hope for an >>> explanation >>> of what consciousness is. >>> >>> A number e can refer to itself and develop true belief about itself, >>> including some guess in its relative consistency. >> >> >> I can understand self-referentiality, and at the same time that there >> is "something" to it that is profound but not fully graspable -- as >> Hofstadter talks about with his "strange loops". >> >>> Then the theory explains >>> why any Gödel-Löbian machine can access to the truth that such belief can >>> be >>> correctly (but that is not seen by the machine, only by god/truth) >>> related >>> to the truth, but only in a non communicable way. So the machine knows >>> truth, that she is unable to justify, and can only seem mysterious. >> >> >> I am ok with this. > > > Then, it is weirder for me why you are not convinced by the machine's > explanation of consciousness.
But you conclude yourself, that the machine knows truth, that is unable to justify, and can only seem mysterious. The fact that I find consciousness mysterious isn't exactly what you would expect? > >> >>> That does not explains the whole of consciousness, but that reduce its >>> mystery to the mystery of our belief in anything Turing universal, like >>> the >>> numbers. >>> >>> But then again, the numbers explains, by themselves, why if you belief in >>> anything less than them, you cannot get them, and so justify their >>> mysterious character. We don't know, and it is the fate of any machine to >>> not know that. >>> >>> Don't mind to much. I am not sure if what you miss is a part of >>> mathematical >>> logic, or something about consciousness. >> >> >> Again, I am convinced by your explanation of why the mystery exists. > > > The mystery is our understanding or belief (in apparently a finite time) of > elementary arithmetic. > > > > >> For me, the hard problem remains: you talk about mathematical >> constructs. > > > Only half of the time, unless you put mathematical truth in the mathematical > construct, something typically impossible to do, except for some > approximation, for theories much simpler than ourself. I guess you know the > difference between the true fact that 2+2=4, and the much weaker fact that > some machine or theory believes or prove that 2+2=4. In fact the word > "mathematical construct" is a bit ambiguous. The semantic in general is not > a construct, when we do mathematics, but partial semantic can be associated > to mathematical construct, when we do metamathematics (mathematical logic), > but this is due to the fact that we approximate meaning by "mathematical > construct" (which are most often infinite and non computable mathematical > object). > > > > >> Physicalists talk about emergence from complex >> interactions of matter. I remain baffled and ask you the same question >> that I ask physicalists: what is the first principle from where >> consciousness arises? > > > Truth. That cannot be a mathematical construct (provably so if > computationalism is true). It is not 3p definable. Aren't you just renaming the mystery? > The whole key is in the theorem that ([]p & p) does not admit a predicate > definable to any machine from which "[]p & p" is (meta)defined. I understood this as a key to understanding why certain things cannot be known, but not to knowing them... > >> >> I confess I have a hard time formulating the question correctly. I >> feel that what I am trying to ask is so fundamentally simple that it >> becomes hard to write the real question. > > > That is common when we dig on notion like truth and consciousness. Those > notion are too much obvious from the 1p view, and almost non intelligible in > the 3p view, which explains why materialist want to eliminate them. Ok. Yes, I came across this over and over. Materalists want to eliminate the question because they can sense that it is subversive to their belief system. >> >>> The core of the explanation is in >>> the G/G* separation, and its inheritance by the intelligible and sensible >>> matter. We might come back at this some day or another. I am of course >>> very >>> interested in trying to see what you miss here. The explanation is like >>> the >>> cow koan: the head of the cow go through the window, like the legs and >>> the >>> truncs, but not the tail. That will play a role also in the fact that >>> computationalism is a theology: the soul of the machine cannot understand >>> rationally that she will be resurrect. That is the fun of it: the soul >>> of >>> the machine says "no" to the doctor, until some leap of faith in some >>> situation. >> >> >> This is harder for me to follow, but I think I follow you on the >> "barriers to knowledge". >> >> I definitely don't understand the cow koan! > > > The idea is that about truth and consciousness we can explain everything, > except for a tiny detail. But with computationalism, we can explain why they > should remain a tiny detail which has to be NOT explainable from the > machine's pov. Ok, thanks! It's a nice koan :) > > >> >>> Maybe I will just ask you this. 1) Do you agree that consciousness is a >>> form >>> of knowledge? >> >> >> I'm not sure. I think that I know that I am consciousness, but that >> consciousness itself is unlike anything else that I can talk about. >> >> I am inclined to think that consciousness = existence. Perhaps it's >> such a simple and fundamental thing that it becomes almost impossible >> to talk about it. > > > Consciousness is the 1p feeling that there is something real. I am not sure > why consciousness would be existence. There are things which exists and are > not conscious. What I mean is more along the lines of: are there things that exist outside of the content of someone's consciousness? Call it collective solipsism, maybe... But the reason why I wrote it has to do with the radical simplicity that I attribute to consciousness. It exists, and I don't know what else I can say about it (from my 1p experience). > Consciousness is more what we need to give meaning to word like "meaning". > It is on the semantical side, like truth. > > Do you agree that consciousness is undoubtable and unjustifiable. I cannot > doubt consciousness because doubt requires consciousness, and I cannot > justify consciousness (cf the conceptual existence of philosophical zombie). I agree that it is undoubtable. In fact, I think that it is the only thing I can think of that is undoubtable. I don't know if I agree that it is unjustifiable. I feel you are using "unjustifiable" as a technical term that perhaps I don't fully understand. > > > > >> >>> 2) that knowable obeys the S4 axioms? >>> >>> S4 = >>> >>> [](A->B) -> ([]A -> []B) K >>> []A->A T >>> []A -> [][]A 4 >>> >>> Then incompleteness explains why this works with "[]" payed by >>> provability, >> >> >> I don't understand this sentence, what do you mean by "payed by >> provability"? > > > I meant "played by provability". Sorry for the typo. It means that "[]" is > for Gödel's provability predicate. It is Gödel's incompleteness which makes > the box behaving like a belief, and unlike a knowledge. Ok. > Imagine that incompleteness would have been false. Then we would have "[]p > <-> []p & p" not only true, but provable by the machine, and the logic of > the 3p self would have been the same as the logic of the 1p-self, making > impossible to associate to a machine a different notion for its 1p and 3p > points of view. Ok. > It is because []p -> p is NOT provable by the machine, that the logics of > []p and []p & p differs. Without incompleteness the 8 hypostases would > collapse. Ok. > > > >> >>> and gives a temporal non nameable subject, which cannot identify itself >>> with >>> any third person notion. Looks like my poor soul to me :) >> >> >> I agree that what I call "consciousness" is something that cannot >> identify itself with third person notions. This is what leads me to >> suspect that it is not something that can be studied scientifically. > > > When doing science, we cannot invoke first person notion (or god, or truth), > but there is no reason why we cannot make a 3p theory *on* those notion, and > do the 3p reasoning and the 3p experimental verification for the 3p-sharable > part of the theory. > > That is exactly the case with computationalism. We cannot define > consciousness, but we know pretty well what it means for each of us, and can > make hypothesis on it (like "yes doctor"), and study the consequence. Ok, this is how you convinced me that computationalism and physicalism are incompatible. > Similarly, Pean arithmetic cannot define arithmetical truth, and cannot > define knowledge, but can simulate truth by the assertative p, and conjunct > it, for each arithmetical sentence to its boxed presentation, and so even PA > can see that it obey S4, which is usually a good axiomatics for knowledge. > And that explains why, if the machine tries the Maharshi koan "Who am I", > she might get the ineffable point. In fact, if she succeeds to remain > correct all along the introspection, she cannot avoid the "ineffable > answer". I have to think about this, but I believe I see your point. Brent argues that AI will dissolve the hard question. I think that people know intuitively that it will not. This is what pop-culture works such as "Blade Runner" are about. > I think that what you need to keep in mind, and understand, is that despite > its simple 3p meta-aspect, "[]p & p" refers to something which does not > admit any 3p explicit definition. That is also the reason why I insist so > much that "[]p & p" is a theological notion, and why saying "yes" to a > doctor is a theological act of faith. The machine is simply unable to prove > for each p that []p and []p & p are equivalent. Only its own G* knows that. I feel that, in the end, this is all I was saying. That you don't have a 3p definition of consciousness, although you might be able to show why such a definition is not possible. Telmo. > Bruno > > > > > > >> >> Telmo. >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> What I don't like about your position is this: just because science >>>> cannot address (or as not so far been able to address) a mystery, >>>> doesn't mean that this mystery becomes irrelevant or that we can >>>> pretend it doesn't exist -- or worse, that we should pretend that we >>>> have a viable theory when we don't. This is essentially what makes me >>>> agnostic instead of an atheist: I recognise that the big mystery is >>>> there. Labelling people that recognise that the mystery is there as >>>> lunatics does not serve intellectual rigor. >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Then we can talk about evidence. >>>>>> >>>>>>> Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to >>>>>>> reject >>>>>>> that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be experts in >>>>>>> absolutely >>>>>>> everything, we frequently have to rely on authorities -- people who >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> recognized experts in the relevant field. I am confident that when I >>>>>>> drive >>>>>>> across this bridge it will not collapse under the weight of my car >>>>>>> because I >>>>>>> trust the expertise of the engineers who designed and constructed the >>>>>>> bridge. In other words, I rely on the relevant authorities for my >>>>>>> conclusion that this bridge is safe. An argument from authority is >>>>>>> unsound >>>>>>> only if the quoted authorities are themselves not reliable -- they >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> experts in the relevant field, and/or their supposed qualifications >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> bogus. There are many examples of this -- like relying on President >>>>>>> Trump's >>>>>>> assessment of anthropogenic global warming, etc, etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that arguments from authority are necessary to save time, but >>>>>> in the context of a debate about a mystery of nature for which no >>>>>> strong and widely-accepted scientific theories exist, it is >>>>>> nonsensical to invoke authority. >>>>>> >>>>>> Also, this is not a place where people come to have their car >>>>>> repaired, or their doctor appointment. This is a discussion forum >>>>>> about the unsolved deep mysteries of reality. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Which is exactly the point. Because their mechanic can repair their >>>>> car >>>>> they suppose we have explained cars - but we have only found the >>>>> Lagrangian >>>>> that described them. When we can write the programs that produce >>>>> "conscious" behavior of whatever kind we choose, cheerful, autistic, >>>>> morose, >>>>> lustful, humorous,..., then most people will think we have explained >>>>> consciousness. Mystics will still claim there's a "hard problem". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> This feels like thought policing. Of course the mystery is still >>>> there, and it's huge! Why am I conscious? I can't think of a more >>>> compelling mystery. Why is it so hard to say: "I don't know"? >>>> >>>> Congrats on your daughter's wedding! >>>> >>>> Telmo. >>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
