On 29 Apr 2017, at 03:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/04/2017 1:18 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Apr 2017, at 23:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
The absurdity, if I've understood this, is that idea of physical
substitution leads to a conclusion that nothing physical is needed.
The absurdity is that the first person experience in physics has to
be a sum on all computations (to be short).
This might cause some problems for the SAN04 argument.
The point of the argument in SANE04 is to show that there is a
problem. The argument transforms a problem (the mind-body problem, or
a part of it) into another problem: to find measure on the first
person view(s). The solution of the problem is begun with the
interview of the GödeLöbian Universal Machine, and its divine
psychanalist G*, say, which can justify many silence of the machine,
and its inability to define a variety of notion, which have still a
relation with their experience.
The "Yes, doctor" assumption says that if my brain is replaced by a
functionally correct digital device (at the appropriate substitution
level), then I would not be aware of any experiential change. But if
my first person experience is the sum on all computations that pass
through my conscious state, then no digital computer could ever be a
"sum on an infinity of computations",
Why? If that was the case, computationalism would be reftuted. But the
sum is not on the computation, but on the first person experiences,
which add a modal structure on the 3p reality of the computations (in
arithmetic, or in any "universal base" we fix to start with).
so my conscious state could not be reproduced in this way.
Mechanism entails a non-cloning theorem for whatever is below our
substitution level, but "bet" on a level such that finite
approximation/truncation of our physical body, which make that
physical body a sum on all histories, in fact a local map of our
histories the most accessible. The physical reality becomes somehow
the border of the (universal) mind.
In fact, as has been said, the sum on all computations is not Turing
emulable.
Indeed. But the sum on all computations can still be able to emulate
universal Turing machine. A machine cannot emulate a god, but a god
can still emulate a Turing machine.
Thus my conscious state is not Turing emulable,
Indeed. It is not even Turing or Peano, or ZF definable.
and the "Yes, doctor" scenario fails -- we would have to say "No" to
the doctor.
That does not follow. You are using an equivalence, but above what you
say works in only one direction. We bet on a level, entails that below
that level, things are blurred, but obviously we have good empirical
reason that they are not blurred so much of making the physical
reality unable to emulate a Turing machine. of course that's the part
which needs to be explained. That was the goal or the reasoning: to
get that problem. Then we can interview the machine themselves on that
measure problem, and thanks to the fact that Gödel-Löbian machine
knows their universality, and can prove their own incompleteness, the
least we get is that it would be prematured to claim computationalism
is refuted: the shadow of a phase randomizer lurks in domain of
numbers-when-seen-by-numbers.
The second problem with the idea that the first person experience
has to be the sum on all computations,
It is the observable "world" which is that sum. the first person is
more like Brouwer-Post creative germ, the intuitionist subject
isloated through the S4Grz1 logic. That one keep intact its 'ombilic
chord with truth.
It is the observable which needs a reality by default, wich is
translated in arithmetic through <>t (~beweisbar('~beweisbar f')). []p
& <>t (& p).
We go from the 3p representational (in a larger sense than say, Fodor)
to the 1p non-representational-at-all, by linking the believer with
truth.
We go from 1p mind to 1p plural matter (by adding "<>t), a way to
ensure our dice will not disappear when we throw them: the
probabilities avoids the cul-de-sac worlds (in term of the Kripke
semantic of the logic of self-reference). You need study the domain a
little bit.
is that this renders duplication of persons impossible. If you
duplicate the computation(s) that make up a first person experience,
you have simply added some more computations to that experience and
the sum over *all* computations is unchanged. Thus there is still
only one first person experience, and the attempted duplication fails.
That does not follow, for the reason explained above. Or you just say
materialism is true, so computationalism is false, which was exactly
the objet of the reasoning.
So, if the "Yes, doctor" assumption, and the subsequent duplication
scenarios, lead to the conclusion that the first person experience
is a sum on all computations, the argument is self-contradictory:
the conclusion contradicts the input assumptions and the argument is
incoherent.
Well tried :)
Bruno
Bruce
So even if a physical universe exists, it *cannot* have any
influence on my prediction. Physics lose *all* its prediction
power. Computationalism saves physics, we should say, but makes it
more modest when wandering on metaphysics.
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