On Friday, April 28, 2017 at 7:22:25 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 4/27/2017 1:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 Apr 2017, at 22:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> We judge theories by how well they predict the world we observe.
>
> Then physics fails up to now, and at least we know why, because we
> know that if the physical reality is primary, we need a non
> computationalist theory of mind, but are not even close to have
> anything like that.
That seems a little odd to me. According to "Yes, Doctor", one can
replace the brain with an equivalent physical computer performing the
necessary computations without any change in personality or conscious
state. The mind is, therefore, instantiated in a physical brain which
is replaceable by a suitable physical computer. Whether the physical
reality of both the brain and the replacement computer is "primary" or
not, this still works. Now if you can make a computer that it able to do
the replacement, then one can surely make a computer that will
instantiate a completely new "mind", and be conscious in every way as we
are. The programming of that computer amounts to a physical
(non-computationalist) account of mind.
Physics predicts that the effect of tequila, but not lemonade, on my
brain will muddle my thoughts, my memory, and perhaps temporarily
elminate them. Can computationalism predict this?
We do have a non-computationalist theory of mind, or at least the
same
kind of hope-for-a-theory as the computationalist theory. It is
the one
JC enunciates, i.e. that certain information processing, specifically
that which underlies intelligent, reflective behavior, entails
consciousness.
As you have said before, once we can construct an effective AI which is
conscious, we will see that the so-called "hard" problem of
consciousness was a non-problem. That, it seems to me, is just what the
"Yes, Doctor" scenario entails -- the construction of a fully conscious
AI, and hence the dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness.
I like your theory as a research project - maybe it can predict
something we don't already know. But I balk at accepting some of the
things you say you've proven. In outline, you say your argument is a
reductio. You assume that a human brain can be replaced by something
else that does the same computations. Then you invoke arithmetical
realism and Church-Turing to say that computation is not physical,
yet
it is derivative or inferred from our experience which is a
computation. The absurdity, if I've understood this, is that idea of
physical substitution leads to a conclusion that nothing physical is
needed. Further, you conclude that this absurdity implies that
primary
physics is otiose. I see two problems with this.
First, the absurdity just comes from the assumption of arithmetical
realism - so that computation need not be instantiated physically.
That
assumption is not something entailed by "Yes, doctor".
Exactly. As outlined above, "Yes, doctor" implies that consciousness can
be instantiated physically, so if it is a computation, that computation
has a physical realization.
Second, when one uses a reductio, after reaching an absurdity to
you go
back and reject some premise. But this case you reject "primary
physics"...which was not a premise. I "go back" and reject
arithmetical
realism...which was a premise.
I agree. And this is true even if one calls for Occam's Razor. That can
cut both ways, and arithmetical realism has every appearance of being
the hypothesis that can most readily be discarded. Physical realism was
never a hypothesis, so that can't be discarded on the basis of Occam.
("Primary matter" makes no appearance in the argument, so can't be
rejected either.)
Bruce
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