On 06 May 2017, at 21:08, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic, according to your theory of consciousness, is independent of perception and physics. Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed by arithmetic and so should be independent of tequila.

That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a machine drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything.

That would be impressive.  Is this proof published?

It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all computational histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be short. In the simulation of tequila + brain, people get drunk.

That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts it because it predicts "everything", including people drink tequila and don't get drunk.

But that fact is confirmed by our best current empirically derived theory: quantum mechanics.

QM also predicts ""everything", including people drink tequila and don't get drunk".

And I give the means to compare the measure, so let do the test, and encourage people to pursue the study of the "material hypostases".

We must "just "compare if people get less or more drunk in the physical reality than in arithmetic, so to speak.

Bruno





Brent

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