2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: > On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > 2017-05-08 8:58 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: > >> On 8/05/2017 4:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> 2017-05-08 8:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]>: >> >>> On 8/05/2017 3:59 pm, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 8 May 2017 4:53 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <[email protected]> >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> >>> I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some >>> further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in >>> these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any >>> comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be >>> helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting >>> because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment. >>> >>> Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are >>> led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational >>> continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to >>> assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting). >>> Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our >>> observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its >>> emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational >>> mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally >>> reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter >>> correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in >>> their effective environment. >>> >>> Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would >>> it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate >>> in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the >>> generator of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely >>> reiterative​ and hence very robust (both in the sense of computational >>> inclusiveness a la step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who >>> is to say that the generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent >>> continuations aren't equally or even more prevalent? After all we're >>> dealing with a Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such >>> library is bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy >>> with Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated here). >>> Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here, such that >>> internally consistent computations self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent >>> ones in effect self-cancel? >>> >>> Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here >>> about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I >>> can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking, >>> there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and >>> forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of >>> view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine), >>> inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net >>> (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might >>> equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking >>> of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps >>> you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever >>> particularly appreciated. >>> >>> >>> I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You refer >>> to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and hence >>> intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure of such >>> consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent according to some >>> physical laws', because it is those laws that you are supposedly deriving >>> -- they cannot form part of the derivation. I don't think any notion of >>> logical consistency can fill the bill here. It is logically consistent that >>> my present conscious moment, with its rich record of memories of a physical >>> world, stretching back to childhood, is all an illusion of the momentary >>> point in a computational history: the continuation of this computation back >>> into the past, and forward into the future, could be just white noise! That >>> is not logically inconsistent, or comutationally inconsistent. It is >>> inconsistent only with the physical laws of conservation and persistence. >>> But at this point, you do not have such laws! >>> >>> In fact, just as Boltzmann realized in the Boltzmann brain problem, >>> states of complete randomness both before and after our current conscious >>> moment are overwhelmingly more likley than that our present moment is >>> immersed in a physics that involves exceptionless conservation laws, so >>> that the past and future can both be evolved from our present state by the >>> application of persistent and pervasive physical laws. >>> >>> Unless you can give some meaning to the concept of "consistent" that >>> does not just beg the question, then I think Boltzmann's problem will >>> destroy your search for some 'measure' that makes our experience of >>> physical laws (any physical laws, not just those we actually observe) >>> overwhelmingly likely. >>> >>> >>> Thanks for this. However I'm not sure you've fully addressed my "path >>> integral" point, for what it's worth. Feynman's idea, if I've got the gist >>> of it, was that an electron could be considered as taking every possible >>> path from A to B, but that the direct or short paths could be considered as >>> mutually reinforcing and the indirect or longer paths as mutually >>> cancelling. >>> >>> >>> Feynman's ideas relies on a physical theory within which one can >>> calculate the phase change along each possible path. The upshot is that >>> paths far away from the path of least action have phases that cancel in the >>> quantum superposition sense. Note that the crucial input into this picture >>> is that there is an underlying physical theory, in terms of which one can >>> calculate the phase changes along each path. Also, it is important to >>> remember that Feynman's path integral is only one means of calculating >>> probability amplitudes in QM -- there are many other means of calculating >>> these, and all give the same results. >>> >>> Hence the derivation of the principle of least action. So the analogy, >>> more or less, that I have in mind is that Boltzmann-type random subjective >>> states would, computationally speaking, mutually reinforce identical states >>> supervening on the generator of "consistent" physical continuations (bear >>> with me for a moment on the applicable sense of "consistent" here). IOW "If >>> I am a machine I cannot know which machine I am". So as long as the >>> generator of those consistent states is encapsulated by UD* - which is >>> equivalent to saying as long as the computable evolution of physical states >>> is so encapsulated (which it is by assumption) - then we can plausibly >>> suppose that the net subjective consequences would be indistinguishable. >>> >>> >>> I agree that conscious states, whether Boltzmann brains or parts of a >>> longer calculation that does not start and end in white noise, are, insofar >>> as thise states are conscious, they are indistinguishable. But the >>> Boltzmann brain-type states cannot reinforce the path that leads to >>> coherent physics, because the continuations are disjoint. >>> >>> As to your most reasonable request for a non question begging notion of >>> consistent in this context, my tentative answer rests on my remarks about >>> the "struggle between remembering and forgetting". Here's where I use >>> Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy, which is pretty much equivalent to Barbour's >>> time capsule one (as he acknowledges in TEOT) >>> >>> >>> Both Hoyle's pigeon holes and Barbour's time capsules assume that there >>> is a coherent underlying physics with regular exceptionless laws. Until you >>> have something like that, you cannot define consistent continuations. >>> >>> >> I think that white noise -> consciousness -> white noise must be of an >> infinitsimal measure for programs generating consciousness moments, because >> it needs a lot of informations to go from consciousness moment to white >> noise, more than from consciousness->consciousness-next moment, hence >> there must be shorter program that goes from one instant to the next than >> from one thing to totally something else... >> >> >> What has program length got to do with the UD? All programs, of any >> length at all are present, and there are infinitely more programs that will >> go from some chance occurrence of a conscious moment to something that is >> not conscious, be it white noise or white rabbits, than there are programs >> that produce consistent physical laws generating the sequence of conscious >> moments. I think Russell's "Occam's catastrophe" is relevant here. The >> information content of white noise is much greater than the content of >> physical laws -- program length is not an issue. >> > > Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but the > measure function (which we don't have) must render the consistency, thing > like complexity and size could be a way to explain why consciousness->white > noise have low measure. > > > Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some handle on > what you want. For consistency, the definition of 'consistent > continuations' for the measure must come from logic and/or arithmetic alone. > > > as for the anthropic principle, you can use the same as in MWI, you are > not where you're dead, in fact you are only found in "you" moment, hence > consciousness->white noise is not a valid continuation and should be > discarded for measure counting. > > > How do you know that you will not be white noise in the next instant? > > Because white noise by definition is not me, so I have to only consider me > moment for continuation. > > > You have some insight into the future? How do you know that "you" will > continue in any form? If you use this criterion for consistency, then you > have built physics into your derivation of physics. >
If computationalism is true, every me moment exists, so of course, there are next me moment with computationalism... no need to have future insight, the thing is to have a measure function on them. Quentin > > > Bruce > > > Quentin > > >> The anthropic principle assumes regular physical laws, and those are >> exactly what we are trying to derive. >> >> Bruce >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
