On 09 May 2017, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 9/05/2017 12:22 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2017-05-08 15:18 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>:
On 8/05/2017 5:25 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>:
On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but
the measure function (which we don't have) must render the
consistency, thing like complexity and size could be a way to
explain why consciousness->white noise have low measure.
Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some
handle on what you want. For consistency, the definition of
'consistent continuations' for the measure must come from logic
and/or arithmetic alone.
A measure function would come from arithmetic alone, complexity/
size/... are arithmetical notion... so I don't see your point,
If one insists on 'consistent continuations' of conscious states,
it does not seem that 'size (of what, program length, or what?) can
really do the job.
it's not because there are everything that everything is equally
probable... the problem is exactly the same with MWI... you have
to have a measure function, I understand you reject even the idea,
so it seems pointless to discuss
What gives you the idea that I reject a measure function for QM in
the MWI interpretation -- the Born rule applied to the wave
function is precisely the measure function one needs, for any
interpretation of QM to accord with experience.
If physics is to come from the UD (computationalism) you need a
measure over conscious states. From what Bruno says, it is not
clear that these conscious states need consistent continuations --
your next conscious moment might be a computation is some entirely
different program of the UD. However, that notion runs into the
Occam catastrophe that Russell mentions -- the overwhelming
majority of programs that instantiate our conscious moments run
from white noise in the past, to white noise in the future --
Boltzmann brains, in effect.
... remember, I'm not here to be convinced in any way that your
ontological stance is true or not (or the ones of someone else)
but to discuss the everything ideas and theories.
Presumably you are interested in tests of these ideas? And the
possibility that there may be conceptual problems with their
implementation? I am not making any ontological claims here. I am
simply asking how one can get physics out of computationalist
notions.
To have that we have to extract a measure function... which we
don't have. But things like complexity,size, minimum change between
computation steps, ... may give a clue to it. The fact that we
don't have one does not mean there isn't any and that measure
function must exists for computationalism to have any meaning.
Assuming it is true, there is such a function...
That is just the usual non-argument -- "If our theory is correct,
then it must work...."
No, that is the usual theoretical reasoning. We assume the theory, and
will change it in case it is refuted. especially so given that in
biology, psychology, and even physics, mechanism is the theory by
default.
All that remains is for you to prove that your theory is correct,
Nobody can prove a theory correct when it is supposed to be applicable
to the subject who brought that theory.
and without making contact with some facts and making some
verifiable predictions, you can't do that.
But in this case, mechanism makes the contact. Compare the logic of
physical propositions with the material machine's povs.
Bruno
Bruce
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