On 9/05/2017 12:22 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2017-05-08 15:18 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>:On 8/05/2017 5:25 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>: On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but the measure function (which we don't have) must render the consistency, thing like complexity and size could be a way to explain why consciousness->white noise have low measure.Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some handle on what you want. For consistency, the definition of 'consistent continuations' for the measure must come from logic and/or arithmetic alone. A measure function would come from arithmetic alone, complexity/size/... are arithmetical notion... so I don't see your point,If one insists on 'consistent continuations' of conscious states, it does not seem that 'size (of what, program length, or what?) can really do the job.it's not because there are everything that everything is equally probable... the problem is exactly the same with MWI... you have to have a measure function, I understand you reject even the idea, so it seems pointless to discussWhat gives you the idea that I reject a measure function for QM in the MWI interpretation -- the Born rule applied to the wave function is precisely the measure function one needs, for any interpretation of QM to accord with experience. If physics is to come from the UD (computationalism) you need a measure over conscious states. From what Bruno says, it is not clear that these conscious states need consistent continuations -- your next conscious moment might be a computation is some entirely different program of the UD. However, that notion runs into the Occam catastrophe that Russell mentions -- the overwhelming majority of programs that instantiate our conscious moments run from white noise in the past, to white noise in the future -- Boltzmann brains, in effect.... remember, I'm not here to be convinced in any way that your ontological stance is true or not (or the ones of someone else) but to discuss the everything ideas and theories.Presumably you are interested in tests of these ideas? And the possibility that there may be conceptual problems with their implementation? I am not making any ontological claims here. I am simply asking how one can get physics out of computationalist notions.To have that we have to extract a measure function... which we don't have. But things like complexity,size, minimum change between computation steps, ... may give a clue to it. The fact that we don't have one does not mean there isn't any and that measure function must exists for computationalism to have any meaning. Assuming it is true, there is such a function...
That is just the usual non-argument -- "If our theory is correct, then it must work...."
All that remains is for you to prove that your theory is correct, and without making contact with some facts and making some verifiable predictions, you can't do that.
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