On 2 June 2017 at 20:14, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 6/2/2017 12:01 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 Jun 2017 19:18, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 6/2/2017 6:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > > > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I > recently posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be > demonstrated to covary systematically with neurological function, there is > surely no lack of experimental evidence. In the larger sense, of any > finally unambiguous explanatory relation between the two phenomena in > general, the question of evidence then depends rather upon what one is > willing to count as explanation. The latter consideration is to say the > least both less obvious and more controversial. > > > Right. And a point I've tried to make (apparently unsuccessfully) several > times. > > > Not so. I have always accepted your view as one of the essential > components of any explanation (i. e. the covariance part). > > In the case of physical phenomena, like gravity, we arrive at a > mathematical model and we're all happy - we've explained gravity. When we > do the same thing, providing a useful model of the brain that predicts > conscious thoughts (cf. electrostimulation during brain surgery) we should > be happy that we've explained consciousness. But NO, there are all the > philosophers dedicated to "the hard problem" who demand to know "what > really makes consciousness?". The analogy in physics is John Archibald > Wheeler asking, "But what makes the equations *fly*?" > > In the virtuous circle of explanation, if you're not willing to count > anything as an explanation, then there is no explanation. > > > Again not so. An explanation of consciousness in terms of neurocognition > is both ineliminable and indispensable from a practical perspective. But > left at that, any explanatory relation with first person subjectivity can > never be more than an a posteriori attribution. After all, an explicit > account in terms of neurocognition is already causally sufficient in its > own right. > > IMO the so-called hard problem is an unfortunate artifact of a faulty > formulation of the problem area. Consequently comp doesn't try to 'solve' > it. Instead, it recasts the problem in essentially epistemological terms, > relying on the simplest assumptive ontology adequate to the task. To > succeed, it must also show that this manner of framing the problem is fully > compatible with an observable physics (and its theoretical ontology) such > that all aspects of the physical covariance remarked on above remain > consistent. All that said, what bears most heavily on its role in > explanation is to offer, a priori, an otherwise absent first-personal > account of the characteristic phenomena of subjectivity. > > > I find we are in violent agreement. :-) >
​Excellent. I think if we can somehow contrive to retain some memory of this mutual accommodation (difficult as I know that can be with our advancing years!) we may in future reach a better understanding of where we may still possibly diverge. As ever, I value your comments and analysis in correcting my own views. David > > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
