On 2 June 2017 at 20:14, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 6/2/2017 12:01 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 Jun 2017 19:18, "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/2/2017 6:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > > > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I > recently posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be > demonstrated to covary systematically with neurological function, there is > surely no lack of experimental evidence. In the larger sense, of any > finally unambiguous explanatory relation between the two phenomena in > general, the question of evidence then depends rather upon what one is > willing to count as explanation. The latter consideration is to say the > least both less obvious and more controversial. > > > Right. And a point I've tried to make (apparently unsuccessfully) several > times. > > > Not so. I have always accepted your view as one of the essential > components of any explanation (i. e. the covariance part). > > In the case of physical phenomena, like gravity, we arrive at a > mathematical model and we're all happy - we've explained gravity. When we > do the same thing, providing a useful model of the brain that predicts > conscious thoughts (cf. electrostimulation during brain surgery) we should > be happy that we've explained consciousness. But NO, there are all the > philosophers dedicated to "the hard problem" who demand to know "what > really makes consciousness?". The analogy in physics is John Archibald > Wheeler asking, "But what makes the equations *fly*?" > > In the virtuous circle of explanation, if you're not willing to count > anything as an explanation, then there is no explanation. > > > Again not so. An explanation of consciousness in terms of neurocognition > is both ineliminable and indispensable from a practical perspective. But > left at that, any explanatory relation with first person subjectivity can > never be more than an a posteriori attribution. After all, an explicit > account in terms of neurocognition is already causally sufficient in its > own right. > > IMO the so-called hard problem is an unfortunate artifact of a faulty > formulation of the problem area. Consequently comp doesn't try to 'solve' > it. Instead, it recasts the problem in essentially epistemological terms, > relying on the simplest assumptive ontology adequate to the task. To > succeed, it must also show that this manner of framing the problem is fully > compatible with an observable physics (and its theoretical ontology) such > that all aspects of the physical covariance remarked on above remain > consistent. All that said, what bears most heavily on its role in > explanation is to offer, a priori, an otherwise absent first-personal > account of the characteristic phenomena of subjectivity. > > > I find we are in violent agreement. :-) >
​Excellent. I think if we can somehow contrive to retain some memory of this mutual accommodation (difficult as I know that can be with our advancing years!) we may in future reach a better understanding of where we may still possibly diverge. As ever, I value your comments and analysis in correcting my own views. David > > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
