On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in
MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never
been proved that it does not. Bell was no fool: he did not
like MWI, but if that provided an escape from his theorem, he
would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did not
suggests strongly that you do not have a case.
Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results
would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated.
This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random
state,
What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
Yes.
As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an
account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's
arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that
would be required in the general case would be such, that if they were
generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of
theories meaningless.
I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that
superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily
incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.
Bruce
But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not
have to prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet
state consisting of two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.
Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until
it is done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know”
about it instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the
measurement in the multiverse as a whole, although there is
uncertainty from the point of view of individual observers, because
they do not know in which branch they will end up in.
Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local,
theory was a better bet. But you have not addressed my
counterexample to your contention that MWI eliminates
non-locality. The time-like measurement of the two entangled
particles clearly requires non-locality in order to conserve
angular momentum.
There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously
reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular
momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.
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