On Tue, 21 Nov 2017 at 12:27 pm, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> > wrote: > >> On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett < >> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >> >>> On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett < >>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW theory? >>>> Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved that it does >>>> not. Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an escape >>>> from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did >>>> not suggests strongly that you do not have a case. >>>> >>> >>> Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results would >>> be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in >>> MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random state, >>> >>> >>> What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free >>> variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism? >>> >> >> Yes. >> >> >> As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an >> account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments >> in a long exchange with him on Facebook: >> >> https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398 >> >> Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that >> would be required in the general case would be such, that if they were >> generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of >> theories meaningless. >> >> I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that >> superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily >> incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything, >> since anything you observe can be explained away in this way. >> > > Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI: > > --quote-- > Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far > apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his inequality if > the world is local. But this requires that the measurements have results in > order that there be the requisite correlations. What if no “measurement” > ever has a unique result at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? > What would it even mean to say that in such a situation there is some > correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course, > the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s > analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical > world do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments > that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed, > the world does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at > all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of experiments have > single unique outcomes, which correspond to eigenvalues), it just seems > that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a grip on this theory. > --endquote-- > > https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf > > > It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation.... Immediately > following the passage you quote above, Maulin says: > > "That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that Bell's > result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even address the > question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous amount of interpretive > work has to be done. This is not the place to attempt such a task." > Well yes, it could be that there are other reasons why MWI is not local, but Maudlin agrees that EPR is not one of them. Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite common in > the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is completely correct in > his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip on the theory -- it can if one > understands many worlds in terms of superpositions of possible outcomes. > But that is by the way. What I have presented is a concrete counterexample > to the contention that Many Worlds is local. Maudlin does not consider this > counterexample, so that does rather render his comments on MWI moot! > > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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