On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
And exactly what is it that you claim has not been
proved in MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too:
it has never been proved that it does not. Bell was no
fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an
escape from his theorem, he would have addressed the
issue. The fact that he did not suggests strongly that
you do not have a case.
Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental
results would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is
eliminated. This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t
prepare a random state,
What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no
free variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
Yes.
As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as
an account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't
Hooft's arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
<https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398>
Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies
that would be required in the general case would be such, that if
they were generalized, they would render science and experimental
confirmation of theories meaningless.
I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication
that superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are
necessarily incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an
explanation of anything, since anything you observe can be
explained away in this way.
Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:
--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far
apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his
inequality if the world is local. But this requires that the
measurements have results in order that there be the requisite
correlations. What if no “measurement” ever has a unique result at
all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? What would it even
mean to say that in such a situation there is some correlation among
the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course, the idea of
the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s analysis,
but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical world
do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments
that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do.
Indeed, the world does not actually conform to the predictions of
quantum theory at all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts
of experiments have single unique outcomes, which correspond to
eigenvalues), it just seems that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a
grip on this theory.
--endquote--
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf
It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation.... Immediately
following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:
"That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that
Bell's result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even
address the question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous amount
of interpretive work has to be done. This is not the place to attempt
such a task."
Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite common
in the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is completely
correct in his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip on the theory --
it can if one understands many worlds in terms of superpositions of
possible outcomes. But that is by the way. What I have presented is a
concrete counterexample to the contention that Many Worlds is local.
Maudlin does not consider this counterexample, so that does rather
render his comments on MWI moot!
Bruce
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