On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote:
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> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, [email protected] wrote:
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>>
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>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
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>>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, [email protected] wrote:
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>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>>
>>>> * > I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI.
>>>>> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some
>>>>> world. **I see no reason for this assumption other than an
>>>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because
>>>> there is absolutely nothing in t
>>>> he Schrodinger
>>>> Wave E
>>>> quation
>>>> about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that
>>>> somehow it does.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's not just an assumption. It's an observation. The SE alone didn't
>>>> explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates,
>>> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in
>>> this case in other worlds. *
>>>
>>>
>>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves.
>>> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the
>>> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the
>>> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann)
>>> depending where you put the cut.
>>>
>>
>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of
>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be
>> realized.*
>>
>> What do you mean by realize?
>>
>
> *Realized = Measured. AG*
>
>
>
> Measured by who?
>
Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the problem
seems to metastasize. AG
> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave is
> A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves
> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a
> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives
> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon
> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person
> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of
> being duplicated.
>
If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without
the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate
your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear
how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor
product? TIA AG
>
> Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.
>>
>
> *That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the
> measurement problem. AG*
>
>
> Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe correctly
> (with respect to their first person notion) having done measurement, and
> got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves perspectives, all we have is a
> structured collection of relative states (which all exists and are
> structured in arithmetic, BTW).
>
>
>
>
> An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the
>> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up
>> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks
>> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his
>> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two
>> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide
>> to make one of them into a zombie.
>>
>
> *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*
>
>
> The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?
>
> the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is described
> by (A-up up) + (A-down down). (with of course 1/sqrt(2) everywhere).
>
> the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down). With
> Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With Bohm (one
> world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but "without
> particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even one lacking a
> body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as being alive like
> you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by making quantum computation
> with oneself.
>
>
>
>
>
> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI. AG*
>>
>> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people claims
>> Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from a
>> metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are different
>> theories.
>>
>
> *They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial one
> as I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is realized,
> that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you insist on denying
> something so obvious. AG*
>
>
>
> ?
>
> I think you should read Everett. he propose a new formulation of QM, and
> it is copenhagen with the withdrawal of the collapse postulate.
>
> All measurement are realized in the sense that no superposition ever
> collapse, but that it looks in that way from the first person perspective
> of the observer. he reduces the quantum indeterminacy to the classical
> self-indetermination based on amoeba-like duplication. The only problem is
> that his task is not finished: by using mechanism (as he recognizes
> explicitly in his long text) he must take into account all computations,
> not just the quantum one. in other word, the wave itself must be recovered,
> and indeed the math indicates that is possible, as quantum logics appears
> at the place where such task must be handled.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Everett is the SWE, and Copenhagen is SWE + collapse. We might accept
>> that Everett theory has not yet justify all aspects of what could be the
>> physical reality (and provably so if we assume digital mechanism in
>> cognitive science), but, to be short, it is less crazy than any theory
>> making the collapse into a physical phenomenon.
>>
>
> *Why crazy? What we seem to observe IS collapse;*
>
>
> yes. but that is the whole difference between a platonist and an
> aristotelian. The aristotelian define reality by what they see. The
> platonist define reality by whatever makes us to believe that we see
> something.
>
> And we do not observe a collapse/ We observe a cat, or something. Exactly
> like the wave without collapse, + a mechanist theory of mind, predicts.
>
> Everett just soleved the mind-body problem, at the conceptual level. And
> partially, because my contribution here is that this *has to be*
> prolongated in arithmetic, and the wave must be justified itself by a
> statistic on all computations. It works at the proposition level: it gives
> quantum logic at the place of propositional physics.
>
>
>
>
>
> * that is, all probabilities evolving to zero except the measured
> probability evolving to 1, by an as-yet unknown physical process. AG *
>
>
> A unknown physical phenomenon that Einstein criticized already in 1927, by
> showing that the collapse would need to be non covariant. The wave has to
> vanish instantaneously. With the many-worlds, there is no problem at all
> for the easy 1927 thought experience: the wave never vanishes, but you
> localize yourself on which branch you are in the superposition.
>
> The measurement problem exists only when we associate a unique outcome for
> the experiment. With Everett, measurement are explained by
> interaction+entanglement. decoherence then explains why we can't see the
> "other branches".
>
> I know that Bruce and Clark disagree, but in my opinion, Everett
> (non-collapse) solves all the conceptual problems that Einstein disliked so
> much in QM. We get a reversible deterministic local physical "big picture".
>
> Now, with mechanism, this leads to no universe at all, in the aristotelian
> sense of the words, as the "physical universe", the wavy multiverse of
> Everett-Deutsch, has to be itself the winner in a deeper game played by all
> computations (which exists in elementary arithmetic). "All computations" is
> a very solid notions, thanks to Gödel's theorem which protects Church's
> thesis and Mechanism from a vast collection of reductionist philosophy.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> *I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the
>>> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible universes
>>> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been, realized.
>>> AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state,
>>> many-worlds, etc.).
>>>
>>
>> *Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of String
>> Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI. AG *
>>
>>
>> Yes. you are right on this. In string theory with collapse (if this could
>> even make sense), you have 10^500 physical realities. In string theory
>> without collapse, you have (10^500 * Infinity) physical realities, at first
>> sight (with mechanism they are just "coherent dreams" (sigma_1 true
>> sentences seen in the Bp & ~Bf mode) by Numbers).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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