On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:13:32 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> * > I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the
>>>>>>>> MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>> world. **I see no reason for this assumption other than an
>>>>>>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because
>>>>>>> there is absolutely nothing in t
>>>>>>> he Schrodinger
>>>>>>> Wave E
>>>>>>> quation
>>>>>>> about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume
>>>>>>> that somehow it does.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's not just an assumption. It's an observation. The SE alone
>>>>>>> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name
>>>>>> indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> measured, in this case in other worlds. *
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the
>>>>>> waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the
>>>>>> assumption
>>>>>> that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong
>>>>>> for
>>>>>> the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von
>>>>>> Neumann) depending where you put the cut.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of
>>>>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be
>>>>> realized.*
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you mean by realize?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Realized = Measured. AG*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Measured by who?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the
>>> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave
>>>> is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves
>>>> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a
>>>> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives
>>>> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon
>>>> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person
>>>> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of
>>>> being duplicated.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state
>>> (without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to
>>> evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am
>>> not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a
>>> tensor product? TIA AG
>>>
>>>
>>> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction,
>>> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a
>>> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP> + |A>
>>> |DN> .
>>>
>>
>> *Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair
>> since it is isolated; *
>>
>>
>> Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the
>> very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.
>>
>>
>>
>> *nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a
>> superposition of states. *
>>
>>
>> Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never
>> eliminate a superposition.
>>
>>
>>
>> * So your tensor addition is based on fallacies, *
>>
>>
>> ? Be explicit, please.
>>
>
> When you write |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP> + |A> |DN> , on left side
> you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But she is NOT
> since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before the measurement.
> AG
>
Correction:
Since the right term on LHS is NOT the state of the entangled pair before
measurement, it must be after measurement. How can Alice be entangled with
a superposition that spans two universes? Still doesn't make sense. AG
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> *which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation. BTW,
>> please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG*
>>
>>>
>>> In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as |UP>|DN> -
>>> |DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction,
>>> and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is
>>> misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational invariance of the spin. So
>>> we the Alice Bob situation is more intricate and tedious to describe.
>>> Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett FAQ by
>>> Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some times. We have
>>> copied the relevant details in previous discussions though, so you might
>>> try to find it in the archives with the key word "Michael", or something. I
>>> have unfortunately not the time "here and now". Later perhaps. With
>>> Everett, it is important to reason independently of the bases in between
>>> the measurements.
>>>
>>> I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a distance"
>>> if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory. I don't see Bell'
>>> argument applying in the MW context, though.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of
>>>> the measurement problem. AG*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe
>>>> correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done
>>>> measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves perspectives,
>>>> all we have is a structured collection of relative states (which all
>>>> exists
>>>> and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the
>>>>> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the
>>>>> {up
>>>>> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks
>>>>> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his
>>>>> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two
>>>>> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't
>>>>> decide
>>>>> to make one of them into a zombie.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?
>>>>
>>>> the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is
>>>> described by (A-up up) + (A-down down). (with of course 1/sqrt(2)
>>>> everywhere).
>>>>
>>>> the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down).
>>>> With Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With Bohm
>>>> (one world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but "without
>>>> particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even one lacking a
>>>> body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as being alive like
>>>> you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by making quantum
>>>> computation
>>>> with oneself.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI. AG*
>>>>>
>>>>> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people claims
>>>>> Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from a
>>>>> metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are different
>>>>> theories.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial
>>>> one as I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is
>>>> realized, that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you insist
>>>> on
>>>> denying something so obvious. AG*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> I think you should read Everett. he propose a new formulation of QM,
>>>> and it is copenhagen with the withdrawal of the collapse postulate.
>>>>
>>>> All measurement are realized in the sense that no superposition ever
>>>> collapse, but that it looks in that way from the first person perspective
>>>> of the observer. he reduces the quantum indeterminacy to the classical
>>>> self-indetermination based on amoeba-like duplication. The only problem is
>>>> that his task is not finished: by using mechanism (as he recognizes
>>>> explicitly in his long text) he must take into account all computations,
>>>> not just the quantum one. in other word, the wave itself must be
>>>> recovered,
>>>> and indeed the math indicates that is possible, as quantum logics appears
>>>> at the place where such task must be handled.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Everett is the SWE, and Copenhagen is SWE + collapse. We might accept
>>>>> that Everett theory has not yet justify all aspects of what could be the
>>>>> physical reality (and provably so if we assume digital mechanism in
>>>>> cognitive science), but, to be short, it is less crazy than any theory
>>>>> making the collapse into a physical phenomenon.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Why crazy? What we seem to observe IS collapse;*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> yes. but that is the whole difference between a platonist and an
>>>> aristotelian. The aristotelian define reality by what they see. The
>>>> platonist define reality by whatever makes us to believe that we see
>>>> something.
>>>>
>>>> And we do not observe a collapse/ We observe a cat, or something.
>>>> Exactly like the wave without collapse, + a mechanist theory of mind,
>>>> predicts.
>>>>
>>>> Everett just soleved the mind-body problem, at the conceptual level.
>>>> And partially, because my contribution here is that this *has to be*
>>>> prolongated in arithmetic, and the wave must be justified itself by a
>>>> statistic on all computations. It works at the proposition level: it gives
>>>> quantum logic at the place of propositional physics.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> * that is, all probabilities evolving to zero except the measured
>>>> probability evolving to 1, by an as-yet unknown physical process. AG *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A unknown physical phenomenon that Einstein criticized already in 1927,
>>>> by showing that the collapse would need to be non covariant. The wave has
>>>> to vanish instantaneously. With the many-worlds, there is no problem at
>>>> all
>>>> for the easy 1927 thought experience: the wave never vanishes, but you
>>>> localize yourself on which branch you are in the superposition.
>>>>
>>>> The measurement problem exists only when we associate a unique outcome
>>>> for the experiment. With Everett, measurement are explained by
>>>> interaction+entanglement. decoherence then explains why we can't see the
>>>> "other branches".
>>>>
>>>> I know that Bruce and Clark disagree, but in my opinion, Everett
>>>> (non-collapse) solves all the conceptual problems that Einstein disliked
>>>> so
>>>> much in QM. We get a reversible deterministic local physical "big
>>>> picture".
>>>>
>>>> Now, with mechanism, this leads to no universe at all, in the
>>>> aristotelian sense of the words, as the "physical universe", the wavy
>>>> multiverse of Everett-Deutsch, has to be itself the winner in a deeper
>>>> game
>>>> played by all computations (which exists in elementary arithmetic). "All
>>>> computations" is a very solid notions, thanks to Gödel's theorem which
>>>> protects Church's thesis and Mechanism from a vast collection of
>>>> reductionist philosophy.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the
>>>>>> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible
>>>>>> universes
>>>>>> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been,
>>>>>> realized.
>>>>>> AG*
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state,
>>>>>> many-worlds, etc.).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of
>>>>> String Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI.
>>>>> AG *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. you are right on this. In string theory with collapse (if this
>>>>> could even make sense), you have 10^500 physical realities. In string
>>>>> theory without collapse, you have (10^500 * Infinity) physical realities,
>>>>> at first sight (with mechanism they are just "coherent dreams" (sigma_1
>>>>> true sentences seen in the Bp & ~Bf mode) by Numbers).
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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