On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, < <[email protected]> > [email protected]> wrote: > > You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing >> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away >> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life >> histories for example. Give me a break. AG >> > > What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to > an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an > infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a > finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see? > > > That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular > assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that > assumption? > The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
