On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing >>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away >>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life >>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG >>> >> >> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to >> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an >> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a >> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see? >> >> >> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular >> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that >> assumption? >> > > The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the > universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's > false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an > *argument* for its falseness? > > > Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply > that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is > infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since > there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform > for it to be extrapolated indefinitely. > Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, since it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
