On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:56:39 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] 
> <javascript:>> wrote:
>
>> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: 
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular 
>> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that 
>> assumption?
>>
>
> The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
> universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's 
> false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an 
> *argument* for its falseness? 
>
>
> A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose from some 
> physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process could 
> operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true even for supernatural 
> creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they might very well 
> create many.
>
> Brent
>

Agreed. The subject is entirely speculative with zero evidence AFAICT. I 
don't believe in infinite repeats, and I offered a thought experiment to 
show a scenario with no repeats. AG 

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