On 29 Nov 2017, at 19:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 11:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
> wrote:
>> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse
fundamentally different from the String Theory Multiverse?
> I didn't say they were different from each other; I
said they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett
which all share the same physics with the same physical
constant values.
I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying
physics -- such as a change in the value of fundamental
constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example
-- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from
eternal inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the
level ii multiverse from the string theory landscape has
physical constants and the number of space-time dimensions
varying from world to world.
unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen.
But lets assume you're right, then the string theory
multiverse must be larger than the many worlds multiverse
incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE; after
all if it contains universes with radically different laws of
physics it must also contain more modest things like a world
where my coin came up heads instead of tails.
I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin
comes up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event;
it is determined by quite classical laws of physics governing
initial conditions, air currents and the like.
That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1
I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing:
air current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum
uncertainties in times of neural firings are not responsible for
the results of coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can
construct classical coin tossers, etc. It sounds like they are
very close to superdeterminism.
Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin
and catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.
Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain
is a hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds.
If random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be
random and purposeful action would be impossible.
But some randomness is useful and evolution would not try to drive
it to zero (c.f. Buridan's ass), which is not to say it needs
quantum randomness. There are plenty of of sources of randomness in
the environment.
This is ruled out by experience -- as is the related notion of
superdeterminism.
I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out
by experience. Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because
like superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced:
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen
in another "world" to a different "you".
This assumes Aristotle, or St-Thomas criterion of reality (what we can
see). That does not beg the question in physics, but does beg the
question in metaphysics.
But Platonists are skeptical precisely on what they see. They want a
theory that they can understand, and this, most of the times posit
invisible entities, from number to quarcks, from the consciousness of
an other, to some possible ONE, from atoms to mind.
Aristotle principle is seen as a form of solipsism.
Bruno
Brent
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