On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]>wrote:
>>
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
>
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.
I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical
evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as
a change in the value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant
or Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot
occur in MWI.
The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.
unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must
be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything
in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes
with radically different laws of physics it must also contain more
modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of
tails.
I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial
conditions, air currents and the like.
That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1
I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of
coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.
Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.
Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is a
hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If random
quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random and
purposeful action would be impossible. This is ruled out by experience
-- as is the related notion of superdeterminism.
Bruce
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