On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>wrote:

        ​ >> ​
        And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
        different from the String Theory Multiverse?
        ​


    ​ > ​
    I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
    were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
    share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.

unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial conditions, air currents and the like.

That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1

Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- only those things that follow from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. So although all possible initial conditions may be realized somewhere, not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be broken.

Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1  The Schrodinger equation predicts some zeros.

Brent


Bruce
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