On 30 Nov 2017, at 00:44, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 9:29 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
Quote. " With our ideal realization of the delayed-choice
entanglement swapping gedanken experiment, we have demonstrated a
generalization of Wheeler’s “delayed-choice” tests, going from the
wave-particle duality of a single particle to the entanglement-
separability duality of two particles. Whether these two particles
are entangled or separable has been decided after they have been
measured. If one views the quantum state as a real physical object,
one could get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future
actions appear as having an influence on past and already
irrevocably recorded events. However, there is never a paradox if
the quantum state is viewed as to be no more than a “catalogue of
our knowledge”. Then the state is a probability list for all
possible measurement outcomes, the relative temporal order of the
three observer’s events is irrelevant and no
physical interactions whatsoever between these events, especially
into the past, are necessary to explain the delayed-choice
entanglement swapping. What, however, is important is to relate the
lists of Alice, Bob and Victor’s measurement results. On the basis
of Victor’s measurement settings and results, Alice and Bob can
group their earlier and locally totally random results into subsets
which each have a different meaning and interpretation. This
formation of subsets is independent of the temporal order of the
measurements. According to Wheeler, Bohr said: 'No elementary
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered phenomenon.'
We would like to extend this by saying: 'Some registered phenomena
do not have a meaning unless they are put in relationship with
other registered phenomena.' "
But you lost physical realism. I would bet that the many world
justifies this, saving a large part of physical realism, the most part
of it. The Mechanist (who thinks) know that the ulimate physical
reality is a projection from inside a universal mind.
This should reconcialite Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and the Everettians,
but of course in science we still shoot on the diplomats. I confess
that mechanism is too much first person plural to me, but then we
can't change the physical laws, like you said, still less when they
are justified by elementay arithmetic and Turing machine's notion of
observable.
-- Zeilinger et al. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578
It seems to me that ontic interpretations of quantum states, *if*
future measurements appear as having an influence on past and
already irrevocably recorded events, are untenable. Now the MWI is,
for sure, an 'ontic' interpretation (an ontic theory if you
prefer). How can we explain, within MWI, in 'ontic' terms, that
future actions appear as having an influence on past and already
irrevocably recorded events? Is it possible that in MWI is both a
real physical object and a “catalogue of our knowledge”?
Thanks for posting this, Serafino. Zeilinger's group in Vienna have
certainly mastered quantum optics experiments. I would like to see
the MWI explanation of the apparent non-locality here.
Me too!
Zeilinger interprets this according to Bohr's Copenhagen
interpretation of QM, but it really boils down to an epistemic
understanding of the wave function.
It is how Heinberg interpret its matrix picture. German Idealism. Not
so far from the Indian-Greek one. Correct from the Mechanist view, but
even mechanism reintroduces a bit more of physical realism with the
histories, which are (first person plural) *real*.
Bruno
Bruce
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