On 13 Dec 2017, at 04:04, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 12/12/2017 6:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ He seemed to claim it negated the main claim of MWI, that everything that CAN happen, DOES happen.

​I don't see how.​

I pointed out that is inconsistent with SWE to say that anything possible actually happens. "Possible" needs to be qualified. For example the SWE in a Young's slit experiment tells you that the probability of a particle striking the detector is zero at some places. It's logically possible for a particle to strike there, but not nomologically possible. Similary if you measure the value of a variable for a state you can only get values that are eigenvalues of the operator. Others are logically possible, but not nomologically.

Provable and consistent (possible) depends on the theory which is postulated. If QM is derivable from arithmetic, as it should if Computationalism is true, then there is a sense to say that what you call nomological impossibility is also logically impossible, or at least arithmetico-logically impossible. Here you use the assumption of physicalism implicitly. I single that out, because that implicit assumption is a frequent source of misunderstanding of the consequences of computationalism.

Bruno



Brent

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