On 12/22/2017 6:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 Dec 2017 11:22, "Telmo Menezes" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 2:01 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> > So we are told. But what if someone could look at a recorded
MRI of you
>> > brain and tell you what you were thinking?
>>
>> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
>> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
>> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard,
and the
>> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are
activated by
>> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated
to my
>> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How
does this
>> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
>
>
> Well put.
>
> However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument
as our point
> of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an
> explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes:
>
> Starting from the position that these present thoughts and
sensations (i.e.
> the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also
to refer to
> events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to
be the case
> that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it
does?
>
> When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps
not then be
> unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic
components
> of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be
mechanisms (in
> the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between
> themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also
> unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed
level of
> analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower'
or 'wider'
> in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that
this is just
> the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms
that we
> might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised
'mechanistic'
> environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the
> 'self-observation' with which we began.
>
> So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains
of the
> precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the
> transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it,
including and
> especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to
an analogy,
> it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD
screen,
> that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to
resemble point
> for point, although is obviously systematically correlated with, the
> ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But
the reason
> of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk
of the
> burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's
brain, not by
> the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems
possible
> for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and
the mechanisms
> of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden of
> 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no
longer be
> 'externalised'.
>
> Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a
conceptual
> apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory
- adequate
> to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between
the dream
> phenomena and their transactional mechanisms. At this point,
enter the
> Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other theory that
cares to
> test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that formulating the
matter in this
> way genuinely makes any putatively remaining 'Hard' problems
seem less
> intractable, at the cost of putting the 'Aristotelian' position
on matter
> into question (but arguably this is already a lost cause even
within physics
> itself). However in a sense it's also a different form of
WYSIWYG, in that
> the dream always and forever is both what you see and what you
get. But if
> you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to
delve into
> the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then
be: The
> concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract.
David, excellent text.
Taking the cue of your slogan (which I love), see if you agree:
A possible model of what is happening is that there is an objective
reality that is independent from any of us, and that is made of
matter.
OK, but even saying that is already assuming more than is actually
warranted by the evidence, as your remarks about the epistemological
circularity of emergentism point out. The more physics is successful
in penetrating the mathematical structure of matter, the less like any
naive version of an external 'world' it appears to be. The culmination
of this is the realisation that the entirety of what we ordinarily
take to be 'concrete' reality must inevitably be an epistemological
construct, not an independent ontological fact, superadded to its
mathematico-physical 'components'.
But that it is a mind-independent ontological fact is part of its
construction, and necessarily so; since what it is intended to explain
is our intersubjective agreement about an external world. Of course you
can reject this and assume solipism, or simply assume that the
consistency of the "external world" as compared to dreams and
imagination is just an accident.
Brent
We inhabit this reality, and the matter somehow generates the
minds that dream the dream. The hard problem becomes hard because the
dream takes a secondary role, and the hypothesized model is taken as
the "hard truth". This model is very useful: it is a good way of
thinking when one is trying to build rockets or computers. However, it
should be treated as a tool and not more than that, until further
notice.
OK.
To tackle the "hard problem", a different tool is more
appropriate. This different tool puts the dream at the center of the
stage. This should not sound crazy, because the dream is more real, in
a sense. We experience the dream directly, while we only hypothesize
the objective external world.
Actually, the dream *is*, or more formally corresponds to, the
epistemological reality which the mathematical theory implies or, more
strongly, entails.
Different questions can be asked of this
model, for example: how does the presentation of an objective external
world made of matter arise at the intersection of our dreams?
Does this go in the direction of what you are saying?
Yes. Bruno has sometimes characterised this as objective idealism. It
takes the basic idealistic intuition and connects it with reason via
an objective notion of mechanism. And in so doing, it holds out the
hope of doing adequate service to both the epistemological and
ontological components of the theory, without distorting,
trivialising, or dismissing either. Perhaps the most elusive insight
in the philosophy of mind is that neither of these components is truly
separable or coherently eliminable from a viable theory of ultimate
origins (aka TOE). Consequently a successful theory of mind cannot be
a last-ditch addendum, a sort of cherry on the cake, to an otherwise
completed 'TOE'. The 'fire' of which Hawking has memorably spoken is,
in a subtle but crucial sense, already present at the origin.
David
Telmo.
> David
>
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
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