On 23 December 2017 at 02:13, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 12/22/2017 4:50 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 22 Dec 2017 23:16, "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 12/22/2017 6:31 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 22 Dec 2017 11:22, "Telmo Menezes" <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 2:01 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> > >> > So we are told. But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of > you > >> > brain and tell you what you were thinking? > >> > >> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and > >> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along. > >> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the > >> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by > >> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my > >> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this > >> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie? > > > > > > Well put. > > > > However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our > point > > of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an > > explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes: > > > > Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations > (i.e. > > the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also to refer > to > > events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to be the > case > > that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it does? > > > > When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not then > be > > unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic > components > > of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be mechanisms (in > > the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between > > themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also > > unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed level of > > analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or > 'wider' > > in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that this is > just > > the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we > > might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised 'mechanistic' > > environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the > > 'self-observation' with which we began. > > > > So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the > > precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the > > transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, including > and > > especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to an > analogy, > > it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD screen, > > that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to resemble > point > > for point, although is obviously systematically correlated with, the > > ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But the > reason > > of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk of the > > burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain, not by > > the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems possible > > for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the > mechanisms > > of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden of > > 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no longer be > > 'externalised'. > > > > Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a conceptual > > apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory - > adequate > > to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between the dream > > phenomena and their transactional mechanisms. At this point, enter the > > Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other theory that cares to > > test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that formulating the matter in this > > way genuinely makes any putatively remaining 'Hard' problems seem less > > intractable, at the cost of putting the 'Aristotelian' position on matter > > into question (but arguably this is already a lost cause even within > physics > > itself). However in a sense it's also a different form of WYSIWYG, in > that > > the dream always and forever is both what you see and what you get. But > if > > you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to delve > into > > the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then be: The > > concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract. > > David, excellent text. > > Taking the cue of your slogan (which I love), see if you agree: > > A possible model of what is happening is that there is an objective > reality that is independent from any of us, and that is made of > matter. > > > OK, but even saying that is already assuming more than is actually > warranted by the evidence, as your remarks about the epistemological > circularity of emergentism point out. The more physics is successful in > penetrating the mathematical structure of matter, the less like any naive > version of an external 'world' it appears to be. The culmination of this is > the realisation that the entirety of what we ordinarily take to be > 'concrete' reality must inevitably be an epistemological construct, not an > independent ontological fact, superadded to its mathematico-physical > 'components'. > > > But that it is a mind-independent ontological fact is part of its > construction, and necessarily so; since what it is intended to explain is > our intersubjective agreement about an external world. Of course you can > reject this and assume solipsism, or simply assume that the consistency of > the "external world" as compared to dreams and imagination is just an > accident. > > > I fail to see how your second sentence > necessarily > follows from your first. Why would the > assumption of the > mind-dependent > construction of > a concrete, substantial > reality > > lead either to solipsism or the conclusion that > the observed > consistencies > are > accidental? > > > It doesn't. I said that if you *reject *the existence of a > mind-independent external world, then you will be driven to solipism or to > some accidental correlation with other minds who report things consistent > with your perception (aka the white rabbit problem). > > To say that such constructions are dependent on a mind is not at all to > say that they are dependent on one mind alone, or indeed that minds as a > class are independent of anything beyond themselves. The concept rules out > neither a plurality of such constructions nor their participation in a > common causal nexus. My point is rather that this very causal nexus - ex > hypothesi the entire reductionist project - need not (indeed must not) > assume that such 'emergent' levels of description amount in any way to > superadded causal influences. One might imagine that an omniscient > 'observer', in apprehending the entire causal mechanism at its roots, as it > were, would not fail to comprehend any aspect of its evolution, without > reference to any notion of emergence whatsoever. > > I think our disagreement centres, as ever, on different uses of the notion > of an ontology. I'm perfectly willing to agree with you that we are at > liberty to use the term promiscuously depending on context. > > > No doubt. My slogan is, "Epistemology precedes ontology." You want to > count experiences as elements of ontology, but I think of them as bits of > knowledge, stuff we know. From this stuff we know we infer/invent models > of what exists, which include ontologies. > > Indeed this is an indispensable aid to comprehension across a wide range > of fields. But in the present case we must be particularly careful to > eliminate all our tacitly projected 'emergent' interpretations. Otherwise > the danger is that we shall be arguing in a vicious, rather than a > virtuous, circle. And the fundamental premise of reductionism is that - > absent any further interpretation - the evolution of physical states is an > entirely bottom-up process. > > > I think that's just saying "mind-independent" in different words. > Physics' story of the world is not exactly all "bottom up". It includes > the Past Hypothesis and, in most interpretations, randomness. Materialism, > physicalism, and reductionism are not all exactly the same thing. > > Bottom up all the way down, if you want a slogan. And yet somehow that > bottom up process is tightly implicated in the construction of 'emergent' > phenomenal realities that, once apprehended, somehow resist reduction to > their components. > > > I don't know what that means. Could you be more explicit and give and > example? > I 've been pondering how to respond to your question. We've been round the block on this on numerous occasions. I get the impression that it isn't so much that you don't already understand what I'm getting at, but rather that you get an opportunity of rejecting what I suggest in favour of your preferred alternative. However, as I've said before, an alternative argument isn't quite the same thing as a valid counter-argument. My own persistence in pursuing this line is not, as you sometimes appear to think, some sort of dogmatic adherence to computationalism, far less an attachment to mystery per se. It's just that I continue to see a distinction where you do not, or perhaps find merely trivial, or somehow intractable in any terms you would find acceptable. Anyway, all that said, I'll attempt a general characterisation of irreducibility in the context of a theory of mind, although it essentially recapitulates my explication of the Dream Argument, which you previously were kind enough to compliment. So, before you can have a theory of mind, you need to have a theory of a mental agent, or knower. Minds are distinct from brains in that their field of application is knowledge rather than information or physical action. To understand a brain is to understand how a physical system translates action received as input into action emitted as output. Distinct from this, a mind requires to be understood in terms of a theory of a knowledgeable agent: i.e. agency as actionable knowledge within and in terms of a distinguishable phenomenal reality in which the agent is embedded . This in turn is to say a reality that is distinguishable from, and fails of explicit characterisation in , strictly reductive terms, although its is implied , or more strongly , entailed by a hierarchy of reductive theories of information, mechanism and physical action. In bald terms, it differentiates the irreducibility of the phenomenology of perception *in its own terms* as distinct from those of any reductive counterpart (e.g. 'neural correlates') with which it may be associated. Such a theory is explicitly differentiated from any reductive theory whatsoever (i.e. it is a 'vaccine' against the otherwise completed project of reductionism) although it cannot , and must not attempt to, evade the necessity of seamless entanglement with precisely corresponding reductive theories of information, mechanism and physical action, without which it would literally be uninformed, inconsistent, disabled and indeed disembodied. Does this help at all? David > > > Brent > > > So to assume that this is the case because the emergent levels of > structure are already simply 'there' in the ontology is to assume what we > seek to explain and hence in the relevant sense vicious, not virtuous. > > David > > > > > Brent > > > > > We inhabit this reality, and the matter somehow generates the > minds that dream the dream. The hard problem becomes hard because the > dream takes a secondary role, and the hypothesized model is taken as > the "hard truth". This model is very useful: it is a good way of > thinking when one is trying to build rockets or computers. However, it > should be treated as a tool and not more than that, until further > notice. > > > OK. > > To tackle the "hard problem", a different tool is more > appropriate. This different tool puts the dream at the center of the > stage. This should not sound crazy, because the dream is more real, in > a sense. We experience the dream directly, while we only hypothesize > the objective external world. > > > Actually, the dream *is*, or more formally corresponds to, the > epistemological reality which the mathematical theory implies or, more > strongly, entails. > > Different questions can be asked of this > model, for example: how does the presentation of an objective external > world made of matter arise at the intersection of our dreams? > > Does this go in the direction of what you are saying? > > > Yes. Bruno has sometimes characterised this as objective idealism. It > takes the basic idealistic intuition and connects it with reason via an > objective notion of mechanism. And in so doing, it holds out the hope of > doing adequate service to both the epistemological and ontological > components of the theory, without distorting, trivialising, or dismissing > either. Perhaps the most elusive insight in the philosophy of mind is > that neither of these components is truly separable or coherently > eliminable from a viable theory of ultimate origins (aka TOE). > Consequently a successful theory of mind cannot be a last-ditch addendum, a > sort of cherry on the cake, to an otherwise completed 'TOE'. The 'fire' of > which Hawking has memorably spoken is, in a subtle but crucial sense, > already present at the origin. > > David > > > Telmo. > > > David > > > >> > >> Telmo. > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > >> "Everything List" group. > >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > >> email to [email protected]. > >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
