On 30 December 2017 at 23:38, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 12/29/2017 4:51 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 23 December 2017 at 02:13, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 12/22/2017 4:50 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 22 Dec 2017 23:16, "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 12/22/2017 6:31 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 22 Dec 2017 11:22, "Telmo Menezes" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 2:01 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> > So we are told. But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of >> you >> >> > brain and tell you what you were thinking? >> >> >> >> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and >> >> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along. >> >> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the >> >> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by >> >> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my >> >> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this >> >> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie? >> > >> > >> > Well put. >> > >> > However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our >> point >> > of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an >> > explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes: >> > >> > Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations >> (i.e. >> > the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also to >> refer to >> > events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to be the >> case >> > that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it does? >> > >> > When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not then >> be >> > unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic >> components >> > of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be mechanisms >> (in >> > the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between >> > themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also >> > unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed level >> of >> > analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or >> 'wider' >> > in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that this is >> just >> > the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we >> > might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised >> 'mechanistic' >> > environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the >> > 'self-observation' with which we began. >> > >> > So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the >> > precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the >> > transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, >> including and >> > especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to an >> analogy, >> > it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD screen, >> > that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to resemble >> point >> > for point, although is obviously systematically correlated with, the >> > ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But the >> reason >> > of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk of the >> > burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain, not >> by >> > the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems >> possible >> > for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the >> mechanisms >> > of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden of >> > 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no longer >> be >> > 'externalised'. >> > >> > Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a conceptual >> > apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory - >> adequate >> > to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between the dream >> > phenomena and their transactional mechanisms. At this point, enter the >> > Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other theory that cares to >> > test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that formulating the matter in >> this >> > way genuinely makes any putatively remaining 'Hard' problems seem less >> > intractable, at the cost of putting the 'Aristotelian' position on >> matter >> > into question (but arguably this is already a lost cause even within >> physics >> > itself). However in a sense it's also a different form of WYSIWYG, in >> that >> > the dream always and forever is both what you see and what you get. But >> if >> > you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to delve >> into >> > the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then be: The >> > concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract. >> >> David, excellent text. >> >> Taking the cue of your slogan (which I love), see if you agree: >> >> A possible model of what is happening is that there is an objective >> reality that is independent from any of us, and that is made of >> matter. >> >> >> OK, but even saying that is already assuming more than is actually >> warranted by the evidence, as your remarks about the epistemological >> circularity of emergentism point out. The more physics is successful in >> penetrating the mathematical structure of matter, the less like any naive >> version of an external 'world' it appears to be. The culmination of this is >> the realisation that the entirety of what we ordinarily take to be >> 'concrete' reality must inevitably be an epistemological construct, not an >> independent ontological fact, superadded to its mathematico-physical >> 'components'. >> >> >> But that it is a mind-independent ontological fact is part of its >> construction, and necessarily so; since what it is intended to explain is >> our intersubjective agreement about an external world. Of course you can >> reject this and assume solipsism, or simply assume that the consistency of >> the "external world" as compared to dreams and imagination is just an >> accident. >> >> >> I fail to see how your second sentence >> necessarily >> follows from your first. Why would the >> assumption of the >> mind-dependent >> construction of >> a concrete, substantial >> reality >> >> lead either to solipsism or the conclusion that >> the observed >> consistencies >> are >> accidental? >> >> >> It doesn't. I said that if you *reject *the existence of a >> mind-independent external world, then you will be driven to solipism or to >> some accidental correlation with other minds who report things consistent >> with your perception (aka the white rabbit problem). >> >> To say that such constructions are dependent on a mind is not at all to >> say that they are dependent on one mind alone, or indeed that minds as a >> class are independent of anything beyond themselves. The concept rules out >> neither a plurality of such constructions nor their participation in a >> common causal nexus. My point is rather that this very causal nexus - ex >> hypothesi the entire reductionist project - need not (indeed must not) >> assume that such 'emergent' levels of description amount in any way to >> superadded causal influences. One might imagine that an omniscient >> 'observer', in apprehending the entire causal mechanism at its roots, as it >> were, would not fail to comprehend any aspect of its evolution, without >> reference to any notion of emergence whatsoever. >> >> I think our disagreement centres, as ever, on different uses of the >> notion of an ontology. I'm perfectly willing to agree with you that we are >> at liberty to use the term promiscuously depending on context. >> >> >> No doubt. My slogan is, "Epistemology precedes ontology." You want to >> count experiences as elements of ontology, but I think of them as bits of >> knowledge, stuff we know. From this stuff we know we infer/invent models >> of what exists, which include ontologies. >> >> Indeed this is an indispensable aid to comprehension across a wide range >> of fields. But in the present case we must be particularly careful to >> eliminate all our tacitly projected 'emergent' interpretations. Otherwise >> the danger is that we shall be arguing in a vicious, rather than a >> virtuous, circle. And the fundamental premise of reductionism is that - >> absent any further interpretation - the evolution of physical states is an >> entirely bottom-up process. >> >> >> I think that's just saying "mind-independent" in different words. >> Physics' story of the world is not exactly all "bottom up". It includes >> the Past Hypothesis and, in most interpretations, randomness. Materialism, >> physicalism, and reductionism are not all exactly the same thing. >> >> Bottom up all the way down, if you want a slogan. And yet somehow that >> bottom up process is tightly implicated in the construction of 'emergent' >> phenomenal realities that, once apprehended, somehow resist reduction to >> their components. >> >> >> I don't know what that means. Could you be more explicit and give and >> example? >> > > I > 've been pondering how to respond to your question. We've been round the > block on this on numerous occasions. I get the impression that it isn't so > much that you don't already understand what I'm getting at, but rather > that you get an opportunity of rejecting what I suggest in favour of > your preferred alternative. However, as I've said before, an alternative > argument isn't quite the same thing as a valid counter-argument. My > own persistence in pursuing this line is not, as you sometimes appear to > think, some sort of dogmatic adherence to computationalism, far less an > attachment to mystery per se. It's just that I continue to see a > distinction where you do not, or perhaps find merely trivial, or somehow > intractable in any terms you would find acceptable. Anyway, all that said, > I'll attempt a general characterisation of irreducibility in the context of > a theory of mind, although it essentially recapitulates my explication of > the Dream Argument, which you previously were kind enough to compliment. > > > OK, you're just saying emergence is cannot be traced backwards to achieve > reduction; that emergence is irreversible. That's not apparent to me, but > it's plausible. > > > So, before you can have a theory of mind, you need to have a theory of a > mental agent, or knower. > > > Well you went right off the rails there. Long ago Bertrand Russell noted > that Descarte was wrong when he bottomed out his doubt on "I think, > therefore I am." He should have only concluded, "There is thinking." > whether there is an "I" to do it needs to be inferred. > Well, I respectfully disagree with Russell, as have many others. What he says strikes me as obviously false on its face. Thinking, sensing or perceiving are always relative to the assumed point of view of a particular agent, 'owner' or knower. Whenever that's not made explicit it turns out to be a tacit assumption, as in my imputing it to you. But my imputation of thought and so forth to you is always on the basis of your assumed point of view, because what other motivation would cause me to distinguish this from your overt behaviour, which in purely physical terms serves as its own explanation? > > Minds are distinct from brains in that their field of application is > knowledge > > > But knowledge about what? Is it merely the Cartesian knowledge that > "There is thinking" or is it knowledge about "stuff" that makes "a world"? > The latter, ultimately. Knowledge as a broad spectrum, but always distinguished from information processing, mechanism or physical action. Hence knowledge of phenomena in general; of concrete, material realities; of the 'stuff' of a world, in short. > > rather than information or > physical > action. To understand a brain is to understand how a physical system > translates action received as input into action emitted as output. Distinct > from this, a mind requires to be understood in terms of a theory of a > knowledgeable agent: i.e. agency > as > actionable > knowledge within and in terms of > a distinguishable phenomenal reality > in which the agent is embedded > . > > > OK. > > This in turn is to say a reality that > is distinguishable from, and > fails of explicit characterisation > > in > , > strictly reductive terms, > > > That seems to be assuming what was to be argued/explained/proven? Are you > just asserting that "knowledge" and "agent" cannot be characterized in > reductive terms. > Don't be daft. Of course knowledge can be reduced to all manner of things with which it is correlated; and that correlation is of course ther knot at the heart of the problem that requires disentangling. But it can't be so reduced *in its own terms*, that's the point. And those terms themselves can't be dismissed, except at the cost of the disappearance of phenomenal reality itself. And of course it's that very realisation that motivates all the charlatanry about 'seemings' and 'illusions' that we've previously discussed (with references). But of course even if we were to accept (under sufferance) this deliberately obfuscatory terminology, why shouldn't we seek to further explicate the specifics of 'seeming' or 'illusion' ? Or are these words merely deployed as a barrier to further questioning? It would seem what is missing is motive and intent, but those may be > explained in terms of evolution, DNA, and memories. > Not really. All those are already sufficiently accounted for by the 'bottom-up' causal level of physical action; they don't demand further causal assumptions. All these so-called emergent levels are useful, intermediating explanatory assumptions, because this is how things seem to us. But it is precisely this 'seeming' that is demanding a more fundamental explanation. > > > although its is implied > , > or more strongly > , > entailed by a hierarchy of reductive theories of information, mechanism > and physical action. > > > But you're asserting the entailment can't be read in the other direction? > Not at all. That's exactly Bruno's point. But then you need a plausible theory and an adequate motivation for deploying it. Now you assert, essentially, that consciousness is simply coterminous with sufficient intelligence. That may indeed be the case, but it's not a convincing *explanation*, since it's also perfectly plausible that intelligence could function identically on purely physical arguments with no appeal to any mental concepts whatsoever. You've also argued that to want more than this kind of engineering association is to demand too much of explanation itself. Again, I think the least that Bruno has achieved is to show that this need not at all be the case. At the very least, that should be enough to give you pause in your somewhat dogmatic assertion of this point. > > > In bald terms, it differentiates the irreducibility of the phenomenology > of perception *in its own terms* as distinct from those of any reductive > counterpart (e.g. 'neural correlates') with which it may be associated. > > > But isn't that the same with any emergent phenomenon? It has its own > terms distinct from its reductive counterparts? Aren't you avoiding > reductionism simply by asking too much of it? > I know you keep banging this drum, but no. We're back at Telmo's point. Emergence is indissolubly associated with thought, perception and explanation itself; it simply isn't an additional ontic fact. So of course we can *speak* of any putatively emergent phenomenon - water, life, the Republican Party, what you will - in its own terms. But those terms are always promissory notes to be cashed out in the only truly negotiable terms, namely those of observed phenomena, the very things I am asserting fail to be further reducible *in their own terms*, and hence whose irreducibility cannot be avoided in any satisfactory explanation. > > > Such a theory is explicitly differentiated from > any reductive theory > > whatsoever (i.e. it is a 'vaccine' against the otherwise completed > project of reductionism) > > > Suggesting you think of reductionism as a disease (making me suspect your > attachment to mystery). > You're being silly again. Vaccines are used to prevent contagion in the first place, not to treat disease. The contagion in question here is the overapplication of a powerful process beyond the point where it ceases to be able do the job for which it is designed (a practice also to be studiously avoided in medicine, for that matter). The power of reductionism is that it lets us get to the bottom of things. Trouble is, it doesn't offer a corresponding ladder to ascend back to where we began, because its effectiveness is all from the bottom up. It gives us extraordinary power to differentiate, but no corresponding integrative insight, except by assumption of an un-argued-for identity with the thing with which we began. So when we come to perception we're stuck with manifestly daft proposals like the idea that neurocognition and phenomena are 'identical' (in some uniquely non-identical manner, presumably) or, more incomprehensibly still, that the latter are 'illusory'. That sort of thing is the true mysterianism; my hope is that some useful illumination remains to be shed on it. > > although it cannot > , > and must not attempt to, > evade the necessity of seamless entanglement with precisely corresponding > reductive > theories of information, mechanism and physical action, without which it > would literally be uninformed, inconsistent, disabled and indeed > disembodied. > > Does this help at all? > > > Yes. > Good. How, exactly? David > > Brent > "Plato wanted us to turn around and look at the light, but all human > progress has been made by studying the shadows." > --- Sean Carroll > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
