On 27 Dec 2017, at 00:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 12/26/2017 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Dec 2017, at 11:25, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 8:11 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 12/21/2017 3:34 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
So we are told. But what if someone could look at a recorded
MRI of you
brain and tell you what you were thinking?
Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and
the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are
activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated
to my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How
does this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
Well, you can't lie to the MRI. But otherwise I agree. Except
that I then
ask, "What mystery?" If having thoughts, however expressed or
detected, is
consciousness then problem solved...or more accurately pushed
back to why do
we believe a philosophical zombie is impossible.
Alright, I think we can agree on some important things. I would say
that we are both inclined to believe that:
"Certain configuration of matter are correlated with certain
states of
consciousness, and it must be so."
Yes?
The mystery here is: why must it be so?
I think the "why" is explained by Digital Mechanism, by justifying
why machine when introspecting themselves understand that there is
a non 3p-reducible obeying to what we might take as axioms for
consciousness (true, knowable, knowable-for-sure, not definable,
not doubtable, not rationally provable, immediate, etc.)
It's not reducible to the machines 3p view, but that doesn't show
that other machines cannot have a 3p view of the given machine, i.e.
the machine cannot know which machine it is, but other machines can.
That is why we do have a 3p notion of self-reference in arithmetic
(like with Gödel, of Davis definition of a Turing machine in
arithmetic).
The gentle logical miracle, due to the set of computation being closed
for diagoinalisation, we have all sorts of interesting fixed points,
and here we get in particular an notion of first person, irreducible
to anything 3p. The (Gödel-Löbian) machines know that they have a
soul, and that it is not a machine, from that soul's point of view.
It is a perfectly legitimate
scientific question, I would say.
Absolutely. Then Mechanism shows that even if we understand how
consciousness can be attributed to one machine, we have still, to
get the complete explanation, to derive the physical laws by the
indexical statistics on all computations.
We can, from outside, associate a mind to a machine, but a mind
cannot associate itself to one machine, only to infinities of
machines and infinities of histories.
When I read that I think there is an unstated condition,"...given
that my theory is true."
That is not an unstated condition, is is a consequence of the stated
computationalist assumption.
If you know a way a universal Turing machine can select a computation
as more real than another computations, aamong the infinitely many
equivalent with respect to their first person perspective, let us know
that way.
The identity thesis is not one-one. That is of course our measure
problem, which explains why there is a (apparent) universe, and
make the whole thing testable, by comparing the universal
introspective physics of the universal numbers, and what we
actually observe. It fits. And that is nice, because with
physicalism it does not fit, simply.
That generalizes Everett's embedding of the physicists in the
physical reality through an embedding of the mathematician in
mathematics (which is what Gödel did, somehow).
But only in a small part of mathematics.
Which is a quality given the range of explanations (quanta and qualia).
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-
list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
