On 22 Dec 2017, at 11:25, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 8:11 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/21/2017 3:34 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
So we are told. But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI
of you
brain and tell you what you were thinking?
Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are
activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to
my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does
this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
Well, you can't lie to the MRI. But otherwise I agree. Except
that I then
ask, "What mystery?" If having thoughts, however expressed or
detected, is
consciousness then problem solved...or more accurately pushed back
to why do
we believe a philosophical zombie is impossible.
Alright, I think we can agree on some important things. I would say
that we are both inclined to believe that:
"Certain configuration of matter are correlated with certain states of
consciousness, and it must be so."
Yes?
The mystery here is: why must it be so?
I think the "why" is explained by Digital Mechanism, by justifying why
machine when introspecting themselves understand that there is a non
3p-reducible obeying to what we might take as axioms for consciousness
(true, knowable, knowable-for-sure, not definable, not doubtable, not
rationally provable, immediate, etc.)
It is a perfectly legitimate
scientific question, I would say.
Absolutely. Then Mechanism shows that even if we understand how
consciousness can be attributed to one machine, we have still, to get
the complete explanation, to derive the physical laws by the indexical
statistics on all computations.
We can, from outside, associate a mind to a machine, but a mind cannot
associate itself to one machine, only to infinities of machines and
infinities of histories. The identity thesis is not one-one. That is
of course our measure problem, which explains why there is a
(apparent) universe, and make the whole thing testable, by comparing
the universal introspective physics of the universal numbers, and what
we actually observe. It fits. And that is nice, because with
physicalism it does not fit, simply.
That generalizes Everett's embedding of the physicists in the physical
reality through an embedding of the mathematician in mathematics
(which is what Gödel did, somehow).
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
