> On 28 May 2018, at 14:54, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Monday, May 28, 2018 at 11:49:49 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 May 2018, at 22:56, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, May 26, 2018 at 9:56:39 AM UTC, scerir wrote: >> Aristotle distinguishes two aspects of ordinary things: form and matter. >> >> Form only exists when it enforms matter. Matter is just potential to be >> enformed. >> >> Aristotle identifies matter with potentiality, form with actuality. >> >> "For, as we said, word substance has three meanings, form, matter, and the >> complex of both and of these three, what is called matter is potentiality, >> what is called form actuality." (De Anima, II) >> >> (According to Heisenberg wavefunctions are "potentialities", at least before >> measurements). >> >> >> Bruno exudes extreme aversion to "primary matter”, > > > Not at all. > > I just show that the assumption of primary matter contradicts the assumption > of mechanism (that is not obvious and requires some work). Mechanism is > incompatible with (weak) Materailsm (the belief that there is some > ontologically primitive/irreducible matter). > > What is "primary matter"? AG
It is Aristotle theory that form arises from the a unification of some irreducible and primary, or prime, matter. Since 1500 years, that doctrine has become “materialism”, which is the doctrine that some irreducible substance of matter exists fundamentally, and which is what the physical reality is made of. Today, non-philosophers can easily confuse matter (what we see, touch, measure, observe, predict) and primary matter. That confusion is easy to explain as evolution has not selected brain for being good in metaphysics, but to eat and avoid being eaten locally, in a material context. Physicalism is the doctrine that physics is the fundamental science, and is often confused with materialism, and this can be done “rigorously” by defining matter the object of a physicalist (in metaphysics) physics. For our concern, Digital Mechanism, as an assumption in the philosophy of mind, (not in physics), can be shown incompatible with both materialism, and physicalism. The physical universe appearance as a reason to exist, and an ontological commitment in some irreducible substance leads to difficulties and even epistemological contradiction. Most intellectuals were aware of this, but the christian materialist era have banished, or burn alive, those who dare to doubts it. To my big astonishment, a variety of radical self-called atheists continue the work of the Church against such doubts, and betrayed their radical religious belief in the matter (oops, sorry for the unintended pun). I hope this helps. This entry is not so bad: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/ Bruno > > Then I show how to test it, and how I have tested it, and the evidences > available up to now sides with Mechanism, against (weak) materialism. > > I only have aversion with contradiction. > > > > >> and Aristotle, the presumed creator of the concept. But it's hard to see >> what exactly he objects to. > > I object to nothing. I prove that mechanism (Yes-doctor + Church’s thesis) > are logically incompatible, or epistemologically impossible. (The phrasing > can depend on some other metaphysical assumptions). > > Then I explain why today evidences strongly suggests mechanism. > > I certainly object to the idea that “materialism” has been proved, or that > physicalism is the only modern option, and common misuse of physics in > metaphysics. > > You will need to understand how the notion of computation has been discovered > by mathematicians, in arithmetic. Gödel 1931 made the hard work, and Gödel > missed it, but then people like Church, Turing and Kleene will make all this > transparent, as Gödel explained himself. > > Ask any question. I worked hard to make the main argument available to anyone > having a small amount of passive understanding of how a (physical if you > want) computer is functioning. There nothing hard to understand, except for > having some ability to doubt metaphysical prejudices. > > If you understand what is a computation, you will, with some small amount of > work understand that all computation are executed in arithmetic, which is > enough to doubt *primary* matter (for which there has never been any evidence > as the antic dream argument already showed). But the reasoning I shared here > run deeper, and eventually, in the mathematical part, get constructive, so > that we can make the test, and thanks to QM-without-collapse, it fits rather > well. > > Bruno > > > > > >> You seem quite erudite on a variety of subjects. Is this a general >> characteristic of farmers in Italy today? Inquiring minds want to know. AG >> >>> Il 26 maggio 2018 alle 10.13 [email protected] <> ha scritto: >>> >>> What is it according to Aristotle (or whoever is responsible for the >>> concept), and what is the basis for refuting its existence? -- in 25 words >>> or less. AG >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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