> On 25 Jun 2018, at 13:57, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 22 June 2018 at 13:31, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 13:51, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Bruno, >>> >>>>> I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves >>>>> me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel >>>>> stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point. >>>> >>>> >>>> We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain >>>> consciousness, or matter. >>>> I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, >>>> something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I >>>> suspect it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or >>>> of the distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or >>>> just why we trust the doctor! >>> >>> I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we >>> are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free >>> and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter, >>> or consciousness, or arithmetic. I believe I have to accept this state >>> of affairs for the reason of self-consistency that you express above, >>> but I'm human and I still feel the curiosity. Epistemic limits are >>> hard to accept. >>> >>> Could it even be that it doesn't make sense to say that materialism is >>> true or false, or that idealism is true or false and so on? I mean in >>> the same sense that the sun is not really the center of the solar >>> system (the center is just a human mental model), but assuming it >>> makes it simpler to describe the orbits. Perhaps assuming materialism >>> makes it easier to describe certain aspects of nature, while assuming >>> comp makes it easier to describe others, but in the end we always have >>> to sacrifice something. Model realism at the meta level… >> >> >> We have to sacrifice something. But the point is that if the Brain or the >> body is Turing emulable, then we have to sacrifice materialism. >> FAPP we lost nothing, unless we lose the appearance of matter, in which case >> the observation of matter refutes comp, but up to now we don’t loss them, >> and at least we have a rather simple explanation of consciousness, which has >> to be sacrificed if we want to keep matter in the ontology, but then I am >> still waiting for any non mechanist theory of consciousness (beyond the >> fairy tales). > > I agree that comp and materialism are incompatible, you convinced me a > long time ago.
OK. > > My point is that, in certain extreme circumstances -- that Brent likes > to point out -- we are bound to act as-if materialism is true. I am not sure. We have to believe in the physical laws, and in physical objects. But don’t need to believe that the physical laws are primary, not that some primary matter exists primitively. Brent accused me recently of taking physics for granted, at the start of the UDA, but that is what all rational empiricist do. I would not have consecrated a so long time making mechanism experimentally refutable if I did not believe in a physical universe or reality. What is not taking for granted is the Metaphysical Theory asserting that a physical universe exists fundamentally. With mechanism, the fact that brain or classical computer exists must be explained from addition and multiplication only. > Surgeries, for example. I don't believe that consciousness is an > emergent property of brain activity, but at the same time I would > prefer my surgeon to assume that. Like the computationalist doctor. The doctor bets that your brain is a physical computer, and that the preservation of its functioning, at some level of description, assure that your consciousness will remains intact with respect to most computations supporting you, that is, with respect to the normal worlds, with measure close to 1, in arithmetic. But this works only if the “observable modes” gives physics. If not, mechanism is refuted (or we are in a malevolent simulation, which is better to never assume, as this can again explains everything, like super determinism or epiphenomenalism (as you said at the relevant place to Brent). > This is a strange situation. I am > not inclined toward hyper-relativistic ideas XX century > post-modernism-style -- that seems like giving up on science and > truth. Sure. Post-Modernism style of pseudo-philosophy is non sensical relativism. Relativism, like positivism is self-defeating. You need some absolute to be able to doubt of anything. If you relativize everything, even “relativity” lost its meaning. > On the other hand, it seems that we are condemned to some > amount of relativism. The relativity of our indexical state. That is the path “Galilee-Einstein-Everett”. It is not much a relativism than a de-anthropomorphisation, as well as a bet that not all reality is an indexical. > Certain questions seem to be forever > undecidable, to steal a phrase. That is why we have to do extend science in theology, to just be able to live. 99% of all knowledge is undecidable, that is why we make assumption/theories/belief. But if clear enough, we can expect and hope to get refuted, which is an honour in science, and should be too in theology. Theology is really the part of sciences that escape science in a scientific way. That looks like nonsense, but that is provably the case for all sound machine, where science is given by G and theology by G*. In that case, we know at least that IF we are arithmetically sound machine, then the proposition of G* are true about us, despite being absolutely non provable by us. I think that with mechanism: fundamental science is religion, as long as it does not make an ontological commitment. If it does, be it God, matter or even numbers, it becomes a pseudo-religion (and pseudo-science). Claiming truth is the analog here of the blasphemy, or communication a G* \ G propositions. It leads to the consistent inconsistency (G* prove <>[]f). > One example is politics: in every > political debate that I know of, both sides have a point. That is why we should keep the good points on both sides, and abandon the bad points on both sides, and maybe get new divides. That happens naturally in democracies, when they are not too much corrupted. > > It seems to me that this eternal dissatisfaction and "yes but" > feelings are part of "the state of affairs" at a very fundamental > level. Surely, but again, that is why we can search a theory which explains that state of affairs, and mechanism, or just the discovery of the universal machine, which was seen as the end of science (for Hilbert, Leibniz, in a good sense) explains why we are condemned to either illumination/death or chronicle dis-satisfaction. That machine want always more (memory and space) … to just complain even more and longer on taxes and death. > >>>>>> It goes from the rough dissociated universal consciousness of Q to the >>>>>> elaborate self-consciousness of PA or ZF, or us. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Darwinism does not seem to require it. >>>>>> >>>>>> It does. When the machine opts for <>p in the doubt between p and <>p, >>>>>> if it let it go, in some sense, it transforms itself into a more speedy >>>>>> and more efficacious machine, with respect to its most probable history. >>>>>> So, consciousness brings a self-speedable ability, which is quite handy >>>>>> for self-moving being living in between a prey and a predator. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not convinced. Consider a simple computer simulation where agents >>>>> are controlled by evolving rules. Agents can eat blue or red pills. >>>>> 90% of the time blue pills give them energy and red pills cause >>>>> damage. 10% of the time the opposite happens. It is not possible to >>>>> know before eating a pill. Let's say the rule system evolves to make >>>>> the agents always eat blue pills and never red pills. Most of the time >>>>> this helps the agents, precisely because it assumes the most probable >>>>> histories. This is a simplified version of the sort of "decisions" >>>>> that evolution makes, and I would say that it is reasonable to assume >>>>> that our own evolutionary story consists of the accumulation of a >>>>> great number of such decisions. I still don't see how consciousness >>>>> makes a difference in such a mechanism. >>>> >>>> The reason why consciousness makes the difference is not related to the >>>> environment, but is intrinsic to the machine itself. >>>> >>>> I am aware to be quick on this, but the reason is a bit mathematically >>>> involved, and again, depends crucially of a discovery made by Gödel, and >>>> exposed in his paper “the length of proof”. >>>> >>>> Gödel discovered the existence that if you have some essentially >>>> undecidable theory, like RA, PA, ZF, there are always undecidable >>>> sentences, like <>RA in RA, of <>ZF in ZF, etc, then if you add an >>>> undecidable sentence (in the theory T, say) to T, you get a theory which >>>> not only will prove infinitely more sentence than T, but that infinitely >>>> many proofs will be arbitrarily shorter in T+the undecidable sentence than >>>> the proof of it in T, making “somehow” T+the undecidable sentence much >>>> faster than T. >>>> >>>> Even if the added sentence is false, we get that speeding-up (even for >>>> interesting sentences as Eric Vandenbussche convinced me (He thought that >>>> this was false, but eventually he proved that statement true). >>>> >>>> Blum has got a similar result in computer science, and eventually Blum & >>>> Marquez characterised the spedable machine/set (he used the w_i instead of >>>> the phi_i), and he obtained the class of sub-creative set, which >>>> generalised the creative set (which correspond to the universal machine). >>> >>> I am very interested in this but cannot find the reference... Can you give >>> it? >> >> >> BLUM M. and MARQUES I., 1973, On Complexity properties of Recursively >> Enumerable Sets, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol 38, N° 4, pp. 579-593. >> >> See also >> >> GÖDEL K., 1936, On the Length of Proofs, translated in Davies 1965, pp. >> 82-83. (DAVIS M. (ed.), 1965, The Undecidable, Raven Press, Hewlett, New >> York., or Dover). >> >> I can give more references if you ask. The Gödel light of proof theorem is >> not very difficult. I can prove it online, or you can look at Torkel >> Franzen’s book on the “misuse of Gödel”). >> Neil Cutland gives a nice proof of the Blum speed-up theorem. > > Thanks a lot Bruno. > >> >>> >>>> This means that if you take a slow universal machine, like the Babbage >>>> Machine, and a very efficacious machine, like a super-quantum computer, >>>> then you can by make the Babbage machine more rapid than the quantum >>>> computer on *almost* all inputs (= all except a finite number of >>>> exceptions), and even arbitrarily more rapid. Of course the “almost” limit >>>> seriously the applicability of that theorem, but in arithmetic, and for >>>> the FPI, that can play a rôle. >>> >>> Very interesting, and I think related to my AGI obsessions. I have >>> thought for a long time that AI is not intrinsically hard, but what >>> makes it seem hard is that the problem itself is ill-defined, and >>> rests on an assumption of generality of human intelligence that is not >>> really the case. >> >> I agree. >> >> >>> >>>> In particular, take a machine which observe itself, and as some >>>> inductive-inference ability. By Gödel, or G, the machine can prove that if >>>> she is consistent, then her consistency is not provable. The machine can >>>> also see that she never succeed in proving her consistency, and eventually >>>> link this with the fact that her consistency (<>t) is not provable. Then, >>>> the machine can guess that she is consistent, by the adductive >>>> inductive-inference ability, and she can transform itself in a new machine >>>> with “<>t” added as a new axiom. That machine will be (theoretically) more >>>> efficacious (with some practical drawback). She can easily prove that his >>>> “ancestor” is consistent (in one line: “see the new axiom!”), and can >>>> prove infinitely more theorem, and can prove old theorem with shorter >>>> proofs. And she can continue on the (constructive, and then non >>>> constructive) transfinite. >>> >>> This <>t axiom (~[]t) is part of your observable / sensible hypostases, >>> correct? >> >> Yes. In the []p & <>t one, and in []p & <>t & p. Both splits on the G*/G >> distinction, which is very nice to distinguish the logic of quanta and the >> logic of qualia. Both are quantum logic. Note that John Bell (the logician, >> not the physicists) wrote a paper on a quantum logic for qualia. But it >> contains an error. >> >> >>> >>>> This does not mean that a conscious machine is necessarily more >>>> efficacious on all task, due notably to those finite number of exception, >>>> but it can be used to argue that in the long run, that make the machine >>>> more efficacious. >>> >>> I have no problem with that. I think that life is always a local >>> adaptation, and biological fitness is always relative to some >>> environment (that includes other types of evolving life). It's an >>> endless game with no predefined direction. >> >> But our consciousness is related to the sum on all computations, which makes >> me hard to have a definite opinion on possible “direction”, defined or >> predefined by the arithmetical reality. >> >> >>> >>>> Your exemple above is a sort of particular counter-example, but it take >>>> into account a social changing environment. Here I suppose the environment >>>> fixed. But if the environment changed, it will be even more benefices to >>>> compute more rapidly, even to find more quickly that she is wrong about >>>> its theory about her environment. >>> >>> Not sure I agree. I would say that my environment can be fixed, but >>> there is a latent variable. Blue pills are usually good, food is >>> necessary and it is not possible to inspect the latent variable, so >>> the belief "blue pills are always good" is both false and a good >>> adaptation. >> >> I am not sure if this change the fact that speed is an advantage when they >> are competitors, or predators and prey. And that might be needed fro human >> (little-ego) type of intelligence. > > I have created simulations that have this speed-up behavior. Were the > inhabitants of my simulation conscious? If they are Turing universal, I would say they are conscious (and even self-conscious if they are Löbian), but the real question is “is their consciousness connected to the environment/history/simulation, or are they like after salvia 40X, i.e. dissociated from all times and spaces?”. A brain or a program associates consciousness/intelligence (in arithmetic) with some histories, like “I wake up and found myself in Moscow”. If your program are self-referentially correct with respect to all simulations going through them in arithmetic, they are not just conscious, they are well associated (in the converse sense of not being dissociated). Bruno > > Telmo. > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Telmo. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> - What is the relationship between consciousness and matter? >>>>>> >>>>>> The first is true, the second is consistent. >>>>> >>>>> Ok. It's hard to disagree. >>>> >>>> That is one of the reason why the logic of consciousness/soul/first person >>>> will be given by []p & p, and the logic of matter will be given by []p & >>>> <>p. >>>> Another reason is provided by the Kripke semantics, where <>t entails that >>>> we are not in a cul-de-sac world, where probabilities by default do not >>>> make sense. >>>> There are other reasons, but they are more technical, so I keep them for >>>> later discussions. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> (And I hope that the first is first person and the second is first >>>>>> person plural, but that is exactly what Everett or QM confirms, but is >>>>>> still unclear in arithmetic. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> - Is there a reality that is external to conscious perception? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The arithmetical reality, from which conscious perception build up the >>>>>> histories. Some having long and deep reason above the substitution >>>>>> level, as, by the delay invariance in the first person perspective, >>>>>> below our substitution level, we have only a statistics on many >>>>>> histories, obeying some quantum (like) logic. The apparent primary >>>>>> physical reality is really a sum on all “fictions”. >>>>>> >>>>>> As long as nature continue to verify this, I think that explain a lot. >>>>>> Note that the soul ([]p & p) is not a machine, in its own perspective. >>>>>> Only in God eyes, but even that is an open question for the completed >>>>>> quantified theory of the soul, where evidences exist that even God is >>>>>> limited to that respect, which might explain why even God cannot predict >>>>>> to you, where you will feel after a duplication. >>>>> >>>>> My intuitive understanding of FPI is that both branches occur, they >>>>> are both equally real and both are experienced in the first person, >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> but from within one branch one cannot perceive the other, so the >>>>> indeterminacy is, in a sense, an illusion created by the limitations >>>>> of our own awareness -- the same limitations, of course, that make the >>>>> human experience possible. >>>> >>>> Exactly. To be sure, the word “illusion” is perhaps too strong, as in M, >>>> and in W, you do “really” feel to be in one city, when we assume >>>> computationalism. But I am rather OK. From God eyes the personality >>>> identity is an illusion, but then all the observable is, which is coherent >>>> with the fact that in God eyes, only number, addition and multiplication >>>> are not an illusion. Science becomes a study of the laws of universal >>>> machine illusions, but as you know I prefer to call them dreams. >>>> (Computations as seen by a Löbian machine supported by that computation. >>>> The physical become the invariant in the statistics on all computations, >>>> seen from the first person point of view). >>>> >>>> Don’t hesitate to tell me you are still unsatisfied, but maybe you could >>>> try to formulate what is missing. As you know: the theory will explained >>>> 99,9% of consciousness and will explain why something (“1%”) must >>>> necessarily feel to be not explainable (to avoid inconsistency). >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Telmo. >>>>> >>>>>> Please, demolish me now. What do I miss? (Of course, I will be unable to >>>>>> explain where the numbers comes from, but this, up to recursive >>>>>> equivalence, the universal machine (Löbian like PA) can already explain >>>>>> to be not explainable). >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My view is scientifically speaking we never know anything >>>>>>>> "fundamental" and >>>>>>>> the search for it is like the hunting of the snark. We seek theories >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> more scope and more accuracy, but being "more fundamental" doesn't >>>>>>>> entail >>>>>>>> that something is most fundamental. Mystics like Bruno postulate >>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>> and then build structures on it which, by some (often small) agreement >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> experience, PROVE their postulates. But as Feynman used to point out, >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is Greek mathematics. Science is like Persian mathematics in which the >>>>>>>> mathematician seeks to identify all the possible axiom sets that >>>>>>>> entail the >>>>>>>> observations. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I tend to agree that scientifically we never know anything >>>>>>> fundamental. I do believe that it is possible to use reason to acquire >>>>>>> knowledge by means that are not the scientific method. I am certain >>>>>>> that I possess knowledge that was not acquired by scientific means, >>>>>>> for example I know how it feels to be me. Even if my metaphysical >>>>>>> obsessions are a fool's errand, I do think it is valuable to know >>>>>>> where the boundaries of scientific knowledge are, and be humble enough >>>>>>> to recognize them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I feel that a lot of resistance to this stuff comes from a fear that >>>>>>> one is trying to slide religion or the supernatural through the back >>>>>>> door, so to speak. I trust that you believe that I am not trying to >>>>>>> sell anything like that. I only proclaim my ignorance, and the >>>>>>> ignorance of everyone else. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Telmo. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> We >>>>>>>>>> work with reasonable hypothesis that are not contradicted by the >>>>>>>>>> evidence >>>>>>>>>> and have predictive power. So the anesthesiologist will be able to >>>>>>>>>> predict >>>>>>>>>> that you will be inert and unresponsive during the operation and you >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> not remember any of it and will not even feel that time has passed. >>>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> also be able to predict that this can also be achieved by a strong >>>>>>>>>> blow >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> the head... but not to the foot. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups >>>>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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