> On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:20, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Thursday, July 5, 2018 at 3:09:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 3 Jul 2018, at 15:09, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> These ideas about algorithms that can detect nonsense seem to run afoul of >> Turing's proof there is no universal TM that can determine if all TMs can >> halt or not. This is a form of the Berry paradox and similar "unnameable >> number" results similar to Cantor diagonalization. Such a thing really does >> not exist. > > > Indeed. But I do not see the relevance here. It means only that we cannot > recognise a program from its behaviour in general, still less from its code. > But everyone knows who he is locally, and that is only what we need to get > the first person duplication when done (by definition/assumption) at the > right level. That explains the “many-world” internal interpretation in > arithmetic or Turing equivalent. > > Bruno > > This was in response to something Clark wrote.
OK. > > When it comes to interpretations I think Wittgenstein is advised with a > paraphrased quote that which we can't speak we pass over in silence. Yes. But Wittgenstein’s remark was self-defeating, and invite the question “what are you talking about?”. Lol. I made a comparative study of Wittgenstein, Lao-Ze and the Universal Machine in the long version of my thesis. What Wittgenstein missed is that the machine are aware of their incompleteness, conditionalized on their consistency. > I think it best to think according to quantum spectra with some "Gödel > numbering" between quantum numbers and solutions to Diophantine equations. > John Bell proved that any objective theory giving experimental predictions > identical to those of quantum theory is necessarily nonlocal. Assuming a unique reality. I prefer the term “inseparable”, because “non-locality” is often interpreted the existence of FTL influence (even if they cannot be used to transmit information), but such FTL influence seems to me suspicious. Some might disagree, but I have not yet seen a proof that any FTL subsists when we abandon the collapse postulate. Bell assumes that experiments gives univocal results. > Complete nonlocality would eventually encompass everything in the universe, > including ourselves, giving rise to bizarre self-referential logical truths. If mechanism is true, the Universe if the mind of the universal machine, and the observable part of it is a sort of projective limit internal to arithmetic. Note this is close to Wittgenstein statement that the objective is the border of the subjective. > The latter are not usually considered to be in the realm of physics. > Experimental outcomes are never considered with respect to such > self-referential loops. It appears with Galilee, Einstein, Everett. Mechanism pushes this to its logical limit. > However, this is because as with ψ-epistemic interpretations the quantum and > classical worlds are considered distinct. Heisenberg however showed there is > a problem with understanding the cut between the two. This leads to > Schödinger's cat problem. MWI is ψ-ontic, and in effect invokes nonlocal > variables that are the other worlds. Nonlocality in ψ-ontic interpretations > are instead of being a formal feature of QM as described topologically by > quotient groups and spaces is rather laden down with hidden variables. These > problems may be due to the fact we avoid looking at nonlocality in its > complete glory, and that the measurement problem and related issues of > quantum-classical dichotomy may be due to the fact an observer is really just > a part of a quantum system observing itself. The quantum itself is due to the arithmetical reality observing itself. With p being a sigma-1 sentences, incompleteness imposes the following variants: p truth []p belief []p & p knowledge []p & <>t observable. (And it explains the quantum formally and intuitively with the many-histories). []p & <>t & p sensitive The whole physicalness comes from the universal machine observable mode. The “<>t” assures it makes probabilistic sense. It avoids the cul-de-sac world where probabilities makes no sense (intuitively and formally). > > The Davis, Matiyasevich, Putnam, Robinson (DMPR) theorem proves that the > solutions for any general element of a Diophantine set is Turing halting, but > that any other element may not be. This means the solutions to Diophantine > equations are recursively enumerable, and there is a Gödel theorem aspect to > this. Recursively enumerable, and creative, in Elis Post sense. All programs, including all quantum computer, can be simulated exactly (emulated) by one degree 4 Diophantine equation. > Now if we have some scheme for Gödel numbering quantum eigenvalues gn(λ) → > P(a, x_1, x_2, ..., x_n), for λ an eigenvalue with a code mapped to the > solution of a Diophantine equation. > > The non-solutions may then be the emergence of classicality. Quantum physics > does not predict chaotic behavior, and chaotic behavior is in principle an > endless recursion of orbits and "filigree" that is recursively enumerable. > This may then be a way to think about the relationship between quantum > mechanics and the emergence of classical physics with einselection. What can be proved is that the whole of physics has to be explained by a “classical” statistics on all computations. Preliminary results shows that this imposed an internal quantum)like structure to arithmetic “seen from inside”, with “seen from inside” defined, notably, by the variant of provability, like the one mentioned above. Physics should be reducible to the classical universal machine psychology/theology, which is itself reducible to elementary arithmetic. Bruno > > LC > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
