> On 23 Jul 2018, at 13:46, Lawrence Crowell <[email protected]> > wrote: > > This is one reason I am not a big upholder of any particular quantum > interpretation. They all seem to lead to some intellectual cul de sac. The > MWI does seem to imply a kind of coordinate dependency, a dependency tied to > Hilbert space, that is outside of physical theory in a proper sense. Other > interpretations have their problems as well.
Everett makes clear that there is no base problem, and that the relative sates are independent of any choice of coordinate. The mind-body problem re-introduce special coordinate, but that is like going to the moon. In practice, brains and rockets needs some base, and there are some explanations, given by Zurek, why the position base has to play a more important role for (universal) machine to develop. But that choice play no role for the physical reality, only for the biological and psychological reality. Everett theory is actually not an interpretation. It is the Copenhagen theory minus the projection postulate. Everett theory is just the (common) assumption that physicist obeys to the laws of physics. In this case, it means that they obey to quantum mechanics. Then, like Galilee did explain why we don’t feel like the Earth is moving, he explains in great details why we can’t see or feel macroscopic superposition, nor fell consciousness differentiating. "Many-histories” might seems strange, but not as nonsensical than FTL or physical 3p indeterminacy, Imo. Bruno > > LC > > On Saturday, July 21, 2018 at 6:52:37 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 05:42:48AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > > > > The world splitting "at once" runs into some funny issues with relativity. > > Does the world split at one by observer A's frame or B's frame? For that > > matter, it is hard to know how to assign the split in the local frame of an > > observer. I think in some ways this has a relationship to the illusion of > > there being a "now" or present moment in time. In fact it may in general > > point to the whole illusion of consciousness itself. QM may in fact unravel > > much of philosophy not only in our ideas of ontology and epistemology, but > > with Descarte's assertion of existential certainty with "I think, therefore > > I am." > > I would think each observer splits the worlds in er own reference > frame. Quite solipsistic, in a way, in the sense of there only being > one real observer per world. This pushes the problem into how the > disparate worlds come to interact - ie how does observer A compare > notes with observer B. We can note that from observer A's perspective, > observer B is a physical process (a human being, a brain, or even just > some words displayed on a computer screen), and thus compatible with > all other physical processes in A's world. Likewise for observer > B. For space-like separated observers, from A's perspective, the > physical process that is B is receipt of communication, more likely > the words displayed on the computer screen in the examples above. This > occurs at subluminal speed. The worlds splitting will be instantaneous > in observer A's reference frame (ditto a completely independent split > in observer B's reference frame). > > This does contrast with the point of view that MWI branching is more > of a physical process that proceeds at subluminal speeds a la David > Deutsch. But is there a problem with that picture? > > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] <javascript:> > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > <http://www.hpcoders.com.au/> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
