> On 25 Jul 2018, at 16:36, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 10:47 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net > <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: > > > On 7/24/2018 7:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 7:47 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >> >> >> On 7/24/2018 7:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018, 10:44 PM Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 7/23/2018 8:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> > Other mathematics might work, but this seems to be the absolute >>> > simplest and with the least assumptions. It comes from pure >>> > mathematical truth concerning integers. You don't need set theory, or >>> > reals, or machines with infinite tapes. You just need a single >>> > equation, which needs math no more advanced than whats taught in >>> > elementary school. I can't imagine a TOE that could assume less. >>> >>> It might be interesting except that it executes all possible >>> algorithms. Another instance of proving too much. >>> >>> Now if you would find the diophantine equations that compute this world >>> and only this world that would be something. >>> >>> Well for you to have a valid doubt regarding the everything predicted to >>> exist by all computations, you would need to show why you expect each >>> individual being within that everything should also be able to see >>> everything. >> >> So if I tell you everything described in every novel ever written really >> happened, but on a different planets (many also called "Earth") you >> couldn't doubt that unless you could show that you should have been able to >> see all those novels play out. >> >> If a theory predicts that everything exists, and also explains why you >> shouldn't expect to see everything even though everything exists, then you >> can't use your inability to see everything that exists as a criticism of the >> theory. > > However, I can use the incoherence of "everything exists" to reject it. > > You could, but Robinson arithmetic is fairly coherent, in my opinion.
Indeed. Robinso Arithmetic, or Shoenfinkel-Curry combinator theory proves the existence of a quantum universal dovetailer. Of course that does not solve the mind-body problem, we have still to extract it from self-reference to distinguish qualia and quanta. If some people are interested, I can show how the two axioms Kxy = x and Sxyz (+ few legality axioms and rules, but without classical logic (unlike Robison arithmetic) gives a Turing complete theory. I have all this fresh in my head because I have just finished a thorough course on this. Combinators are also interesting to explain what is a computation and for differentiating different sorts of computation, including already sort of “physical computation”. Yet it would be treachery to use this directly. To distinguish 3p and 1p, and 3-1 quanta with 1-p qualia, we need to extract them from Löb’s formula, and use Löbian combinators. I will probably type a summary here. Bruno > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
