> On 28 Jul 2018, at 11:11, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 7:26:56 PM UTC, Brent wrote: > > > On 7/25/2018 11:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Jul 2018, at 16:36, Jason Resch <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 10:47 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 7/24/2018 7:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 7:47 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7/24/2018 7:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018, 10:44 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 7/23/2018 8:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> > Other mathematics might work, but this seems to be the absolute >>>>> > simplest and with the least assumptions. It comes from pure >>>>> > mathematical truth concerning integers. You don't need set theory, or >>>>> > reals, or machines with infinite tapes. You just need a single >>>>> > equation, which needs math no more advanced than whats taught in >>>>> > elementary school. I can't imagine a TOE that could assume less. >>>>> >>>>> It might be interesting except that it executes all possible >>>>> algorithms. Another instance of proving too much. >>>>> >>>>> Now if you would find the diophantine equations that compute this world >>>>> and only this world that would be something. >>>>> >>>>> Well for you to have a valid doubt regarding the everything predicted to >>>>> exist by all computations, you would need to show why you expect each >>>>> individual being within that everything should also be able to see >>>>> everything. >>>> >>>> So if I tell you everything described in every novel ever written really >>>> happened, but on a different planets (many also called "Earth") you >>>> couldn't doubt that unless you could show that you should have been able >>>> to see all those novels play out. >>>> >>>> If a theory predicts that everything exists, and also explains why you >>>> shouldn't expect to see everything even though everything exists, then you >>>> can't use your inability to see everything that exists as a criticism of >>>> the theory. >>> >>> However, I can use the incoherence of "everything exists" to reject it. >>> >>> You could, but Robinson arithmetic is fairly coherent, in my opinion. >> >> Indeed. Robinso Arithmetic, or Shoenfinkel-Curry combinator theory proves >> the existence of a quantum universal dovetailer. Of course that does not >> solve the mind-body problem, we have still to extract it from self-reference >> to distinguish qualia and quanta. > > What does that have to do with "everything exists”,
Brent, I did not find this post. I answer here. “everything exists” has never been taken literally, in this everything-list. At the worst, we intent “every-consistent-things”. It has been clear that with computationalism, the everything is “all computations”, which is a constructive notion (cf the universal dovetailer, or the sigma_1 truth, …). > which is not only incoherent, but it is empirically false? There is this > myth that "everything exists" or "everything happens" is a consequence of > quantum mechanics and it therefore proved by physics. But quantum mechanics > predicts probability(x)=0 for many values of x, c.f. arXiv:0702121 Like the universal dovetailer, or its logical specification: which makes infinitely many proposition wrong. I am sure you know that no-one in this claim, neither from computationalism, nor from QM-without-collapse, that everything happen. That myth is a bit straw-man. Now, if you believe in 2+2=4 & Co., the many-computations is already in a tiny segment of the arithmetical (standard) model/truth, and indeed accessed by a very weak theory like Robinson Arithmetic. That is obviously consistent. > > Brent > > I would rather call "everything happens" an illusion rather than a myth, and > IMO it originates from the interpretation of the superposition that all > components states, Of course, that is not my case. I discover the “many computations” in the mechanist theory of mind, or just in arithmetic. I actually predicted that we must (when assuming Mechanism) see the many-history aspect of the physical reality by looking below our substitution level. At that time, and later, I will believe in the collapse axiom, and I took QM as a threat to Mechanism, until I read Everett (and DeWitt’s short paper in Physics Today). After that, I consider QM as confirming Mechanism, and quite so after Aspect experiment. Grayson, I don’t see how you can accept quantum mechanics, and not the physical reality of the superpositions. I am aware of many attempts to select branches in the Wave, but all either change QM and propose different theories (usually not confirmed, sometimes non sensical, …) or admit FTL, which makes not much sense to me. > which generally have different probabilities, physically exist, or co-exist. > This is what I have been arguing here for some time now, and feeling like a > voice crying in the wilderness. I try to make sense of what you say, but I have not yet succeed. Even the macroscopic superposition are direct consequences of the two linearities of QM (evolution and tensor product). The theory explain well why we can’t “see” the superposition once they involve the observers. > Moreover, it is from this illusion that I trace the origin of the MWI. It is > a subtle connecting of dots which has led otherwise sharp minds, to go > astray. And your opinion is what? AG I think Brent said he is agnostic, but I let him make the precisions. Bruno > >> >> If some people are interested, I can show how the two axioms Kxy = x and >> Sxyz (+ few legality axioms and rules, but without classical logic (unlike >> Robison arithmetic) gives a Turing complete theory. I have all this fresh in >> my head because I have just finished a thorough course on this. Combinators >> are also interesting to explain what is a computation and for >> differentiating different sorts of computation, including already sort of >> “physical computation”. Yet it would be treachery to use this directly. To >> distinguish 3p and 1p, and 3-1 quanta with 1-p qualia, we need to extract >> them from Löb’s formula, and use Löbian combinators. I will probably type a >> summary here. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <javascript:>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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