On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 5:46:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10/27/2018 1:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences.  It's not about 
>>> existence.  The sentences might be about the existence of something, but 
>>> that's different.  Or the sentences may have variables quantified by 
>>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too.  To say logical 
>>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> In other words:
>>
>> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language :
>>
>>
>> *As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the 
>> world’ or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be 
>> possessed or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the 
>> traditional philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which 
>> vocabularies have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become 
>> reconciled to the idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of 
>> it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather 
>> than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we 
>> should at last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that 
>> truth is made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that 
>> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of 
>> linguistic entities, of sentences.*
>>
>>  - pt
>>
>>
>> But what is true about the sentence, *"What is true about this claim is 
>> just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a 
>> property of linguistic entities, of sentences."*?  Is it not 
>> correspondence with some physical events, i.e. facts?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> In the Rortian philosophical world of *neopragmatism* [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism ], the correspondence concept 
> of truth is wrong:
>
> "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true 
> it must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. 
> This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be 
> distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth."
>
> A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... 
> spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with 
> reality.
>
>
> I'm well aware of pragmatism.  I just doubt that by A= *"What is true 
> about this claim is just that languages are made rather than found, and 
> that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences."* he meant 
> that A is in a pragmatic relationship with reality*. * That's what Donald 
> Trump's statements have"A pragmatic relationship with reality." aka 
> "Convenient lies".
>
> Brent
>


Neopragmatism is a version of pragmatism, as the Wikipedia article explains.

What he is saying above is *What is true about "truth is made rather than 
found" is just that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is 
a property of linguistic entities, of sentences. *


Trump's "lies" have the pragmatic effect as Goebbels understood they would.

- pt

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